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Liability Laundering and  
Denial of Justice 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
AND THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE 
This Note explores the conflicts between two bodies of 
law implicated by a specific and growing class of cases.  The 
Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) grants federal jurisdiction over 
cases brought by aliens alleging tortious violations of 
international law.1  Victims and human rights groups have 
increasingly used the ATS as an enforcement tool against 
governmental and corporate human rights violators.2  The 
government contractor defense extends sovereign immunity to 
contractors of the U.S. government in certain circumstances.3  
The conflicts between these two bodies of law arise when aliens 
injured in violation of international law sue government 
contractors such as the contractors involved in the Abu Ghraib 
scandal.4  This Note addresses the conflicts that arise in this 
particular class of cases: suits brought by aliens against 
government contractors for torts in violation of international 
law.  These cases are important because they often seek to 
redress human rights abuses such as torture, slavery, and 
genocide.5  These cases are also increasing in frequency 
  
 1 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005).  The brief text of the ATS is as follows: “The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 
 2 Plaintiffs claiming injuries in violation of international law have brought 
hundreds of suits under the ATS within the last two decades.  Before 1980, the ATS 
was practically unnoticed.  This Note will discuss this trend in greater depth infra Part 
II.B. 
 3 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988) (adopting the 
government contractor defense as federal common law and setting forth the standard 
for when the Defense may be raised).  This Note will refer to the government contractor 
defense simply as “the Defense.” 
 4 Courts have interpreted the ATS broadly to allow plaintiffs to use the 
Alien Tort Statute to deter human rights violations.  Suits brought under the ATS 
against government contractors are likely to increase in number, but the Defense may 
bar these suits.  See infra Parts III.B, IV.A. 
 5 See generally Terry Collingsworth, Boundaries in the Field of Human 
Rights: The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 
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because the U.S. government’s reliance on military contractors 
is at an unprecedented and growing level.6  This Note 
concludes that Congress or the federal courts should disallow 
the Defense in cases brought under the ATS, subject to case-by-
case exceptions where an executive order immunizes a 
particular defendant. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Alien Tort Statute7 allows federal courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”8  The ATS thus grants federal subject matter 
jurisdiction when an alien alleges a tort and that the tort 
committed was in violation of “the law of nations” (now usually  
referred to as “international law”).9  The effect of this 
requirement is that cases using the ATS as a basis for 
jurisdiction tend to allege human rights abuses severe enough 
to violate international human rights norms.10  This short 
Statute, enacted in 1789 by the first Congress, received very 
little attention until the late twentieth century.11  Then, in 
  
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 186-95 (2002) (describing the history of the Unocal case and 
several similar ATS cases).  Unocal and other examples are discussed in Part II.B, 
infra. 
 6 For a discussion of the United States’ growing reliance on private 
contractors, see infra Part IV.A. 
 7 Commentators also refer to the Alien Tort Statute interchangeably as the 
Alien Tort Claims Act.  See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 
VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 587 (2002) (“[Section 1350] is today commonly referred to as the 
‘Alien Tort Statute’ or, sometimes less accurately, the ‘Alien Tort Claims Act.’”).  This 
Note will refer to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 as the Alien Tort Statute, the ATS, or simply, “the 
Statute.” 
 8 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005).  As will be discussed below, the meaning of “law of 
nations” has changed through the years.  Currently, the international community 
interprets the “law of nations” to include law governing relationships among 
governments and law governing the rights of individuals.  See infra note 77 and 
accompanying text. 
 9 See, e.g., Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(“Under the [Alien Tort Statute], therefore, federal subject matter jurisdiction exists 
when (1) an alien, (2) claims a tort, (3) was committed in violation of a United States 
treaty or the ‘law of nations’ – the latter now synonymous with ‘customary 
international law.’”) (citations omitted).  This Note will use the term “ATS suits” to 
refer to those cases which base subject matter jurisdiction on the ATS, and the term 
“ATS plaintiffs” to refer to the alien plaintiffs in ATS suits (who by definition must 
allege a tort in violation of international law). 
 10 A more specific history of these cases follows below.  See infra Part II.B. 
 11 Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (currently codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1350).  Congress has modified the ATS several times since its enactment, but 
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1980, a Second Circuit case, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, opened the 
door for aliens to use this unique Statute to redress human 
rights abuses abroad.12  The ATS is unique because it deviates 
from the traditionally-required nexus between a federal court’s 
jurisdiction over foreign matters and the connection of the 
subject matter to the territory of the government that the court 
represents.13  The ATS does not require such territoriality; it 
makes an unusual grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction by 
allowing an alien to sue for a tort committed abroad by anyone, 
including another alien.14  That is, it allows district courts to 
find subject matter jurisdiction without any connection 
between the facts of the case and American territory or 
citizens.15  The ATS provides an increasingly important means 
by which aliens may sue for injuries they sustained in violation 
of international law against other alien individuals or 
corporations or against American individuals or corporations.  
For example, aliens have used the ATS to sue officers of an 
abusive foreign dictatorship using torture16 and against 
companies using forced (slave) labor.17  Human rights scholars 
and practitioners agree that the ATS has the potential to 
become an important human rights enforcement tool.18  
Another body of law, the government contractor defense, 
  
only slightly.  See Bradley, supra note 7, at 587 n.2 (citing and quoting “minor 
alterations” to the Alien Tort Statute that were made in 1873 and 1911). 
 12 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889-90 (2d Cir. 1980) (reversing the 
district court, which had dismissed the case for want of subject matter jurisdiction). 
 13 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 402 (1987) (describing the various means through which territorial 
connections may confer jurisdiction in international matters). 
 14 See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 887-90; see also Andrea Bianchi, International 
Law and US Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revisited, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 751, 777 
(2004) (“In many ways, given the general lack of inclination shown by US courts to pay 
due heed to international legal issues, litigation under the Alien Tort Claims Act is 
somewhat an anomaly.”). 
 15 See, e.g., Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (upholding jurisdiction over a case 
brought by Paraguayan plaintiffs against a Paraguayan defendant for actions taking 
place outside United States territory). 
 16 See, e.g., id. at 878 (alleging that defendant Paraguayan police official was 
responsible for torturing plaintiffs’ son/brother to death). 
 17 See, e.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348 (S.D. 
Fla. 2003) (alleging that defendant multinational corporation was responsible for 
killings connected with suppression of union activities); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. 
Supp. 2d 1294, 1295-96 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (alleging that defendant multinational 
corporation benefited from forced labor by Burmese villagers), appeal dismissed per 
stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 18 See, e.g., Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Enforcing International Labor 
Standards: The Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 203, 
210 (2004); see also infra note 122. 
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threatens to prevent the ATS from realizing its full potential by 
barring otherwise valid ATS suits. 
The Supreme Court adopted the government contractor 
defense as federal common law in 1988 in Boyle v. United 
Technologies.19  The Defense bars suits against certain 
government contractors by preempting state tort law.20  It 
extends the U.S. government’s sovereign immunity to shield 
government contractors acting on behalf of the government.21  
For example, a military jeep manufacturer might be able to use 
the Defense to immunize against suits by passengers injured 
because of design flaws in the vehicle.  Though the lower 
federal courts’ rationales for applying the Defense varied,22 the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Boyle was that the Defense was 
necessary to protect the discretion of federal officials.23 
The two bodies of law created by the ATS and the 
Defense clash in situations where aliens sue government 
contractors for torts committed in violation of international 
law.  Human rights organizations, scholars, and practitioners 
who support the current, broad interpretation of the ATS see it 
as a human rights tool to deter illegal activity and compensate 
victims.24  Allowing contractor-defendants to rely on the 
Defense in cases asserting jurisdiction under the ATS 
threatens the ATS’s effectiveness as a human rights tool.  This 
is because the Defense allows “liability laundering,” a means by 
which the government may use its private contractors to 
diffuse or eliminate accountability for violations of 
international law committed by the government.  Though this 
scheme may sound unusual, the U.S. government’s increasing 
reliance on private contractors to provide an ever-broadening 
array of services, especially in military operations, makes this 
  
 19 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).  The Boyle majority analogized the Defense’s 
immunity to the Federal Tort Claims Act, which generally waives the federal 
government’s sovereign immunity while retaining it in certain circumstances.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2005); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511; infra text accompanying notes 151-54. 
 20 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512 (explaining the government contractor defense 
and the test used to determine when a defendant may raise the Defense). 
 21 Id. 
 22 For example, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the Fourth Circuit’s 
reasoning that the Defense should stand as an extension of the Feres doctrine.  Id. at 
510.  In Feres, the Supreme Court held that the federal government is not liable in tort 
to active duty military personnel under the Federal Tort Claims Act.  Feres v. United 
States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).  See infra notes 166, 168, 172 and accompanying text. 
 23 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509-12 (reviewing the possible rationales for 
applying the Defense). 
 24 See infra notes 66, 73, 74 and accompanying text. 
2006] ALIEN TORT STATUTE & GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS 1379 
a growing area of concern.25  For example, some of the victims 
of the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal filed a suit against 
military contractors under the ATS.26  If the contractor-
defendants in that case are successful in raising the Defense, 
they will enjoy immunity from suit and the government will be 
able to use contractors as a cheap, reliable way to do its “dirty 
work.” 
Further, allowing the Defense would block all paths to 
redress for the victims of extraterritorial torts committed by 
U.S. government contractors.  The government itself enjoys 
broad sovereign immunity to these suits.27  Since sovereign 
immunity protects the government, and the Defense extends 
this immunity to the government’s contractors, allowing the 
Defense will bar injured plaintiffs from suing either potential 
defendant.  This means the plaintiffs will be unable to seek 
damages, and thus unable to deter future instances of similar 
behavior.28  There are several ways to resolve the conflict 
between these two bodies of law,29 but courts should not allow 
the government contractor defense to diminish the ATS’s 
utility. 
Part II of this Note will provide background information 
about the ATS, its history and related policies, the chain of 
cases leading up to its current interpretation, and examples of 
its modern applications.  Part III will address the background 
of the government contractor defense, its rationale, and its 
  
 25 As of mid-2004, analyst Peter W. Singer estimated that over 20,000 private 
military contractors were working for the United States in Iraq.  Bob Dart, Pentagon’s 
Reliance on Contractors Under Fire, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 8, 2004, at 9A. 
 26 See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (S.D. Cal. 2004).  This case 
was filed in September 2004 on behalf of the prisoners at the Abu Ghraib detention 
center.  The Second Amended Complaint contains a disturbing series of allegations 
against the defendants, which were private interrogation services contractors.  See 
Second Amended Complaint at 14-46, Saleh v. Titan Corp., (S.D. Cal. 2004) (No. 04 CV 
1143 R (NLS)), 2004 WL 1881616. 
 27 Several exceptions in the Federal Tort Claims Act could retain sovereign 
immunity to cases based on facts that are likely to underlie a suit brought under the 
ATS against a government contractor.  See infra Part III.A. 
 28 Though it may be argued that plaintiffs might seek redress in local courts 
or invoke occupation law to bypass sovereign immunity, these options are outside the 
scope of this discussion.  Local courts are unlikely to be a reliable option in areas with a 
heavy concentration of government contractors, especially military contractors.  
Occupation law may provide an avenue for a suit against the government, but does not 
necessarily allow suits against the contractors themselves.  See David J. Scheffer, 
Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 842, 858 (2003).  For more on occupation 
law as a potential solution to the conflicts in ATS suits against government contractors, 
see note 242 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
1380 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:3 
applications.  Part IV will discuss the conflict between the 
policies and case law of the ATS and the Defense and suggest a 
possible solution.  Part V will conclude that the policies 
underlying the ATS should take priority over those underlying 
the Defense.  Part V therefore suggests that Congress or the 
courts should disallow the Defense in cases brought under the 
ATS. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
The intended purposes of the ATS are unclear.30  For 
years after its enactment, very few cases mentioned the ATS.31  
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted the ATS’s 
obscurity in IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.: “This old but little used section 
is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since 
the first Judiciary Act, no one seems to know whence it came.”32 
Though the ATS remained dormant for almost 200 
years, it has enjoyed recent attention from the international 
human rights community for its potential as a human rights 
enforcement tool.33  Courts have generally been amenable to 
this application of the Statute, so the trend for the past two 
decades has been to broaden the ATS.34  Most commentators 
agree that the ATS now shows great potential for alien 
plaintiffs, but opinions are mixed as to whether the Statute is a 
white knight or an “awakening monster.”35  On one side, 
  
 30 See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (explaining that 
there is no widely accepted purpose for the Alien Tort Statute); Eugene Kontorovich, 
The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 183, 209 (2004) (“Neither the Constitution nor ATCA expressly resolves the 
jurisdictional questions, and ATCA lacks legislative history that could provide 
illumination.”). 
 31 See Anthony D’Amato, Preface to THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN 
ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY, at vii (Ralph G. Steinhardt & Anthony D’Amato eds., 1999) 
(“The [Statute] was adopted by the first Congress in 1789 and promptly went into 
hibernation for nearly two centuries.”).  For statistics on the use of the ATS over its 200 
year history, see infra note 65. 
 32 IIT, 519 F.2d at 1015 (citation omitted); see also Kenneth C. Randall, 
Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort 
Claims Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4-5 nn.15-17 (1985) (discussing the 
ATS’s sparse pre-Filártiga history). 
 33 See infra notes 118-20, 122-30, and accompanying text. 
 34 See Linda A. Willett et al., The Alien Tort Statute and Its Implications for 
Multinational Corporations, BRIEFLY . . ., Sept. 2003, at 1, 16 (“Following the 
precedents it established in Filártiga and Kadic, the Second Circuit has continued to 
issue cutting-edge rulings that give broad interpretation to the Alien Tort 
Statute . . . .”). 
 35 See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING 
MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 (Institute for International Economics 
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human rights advocates endorse a broad interpretation of the 
ATS, such as the interpretation adopted in Filártiga v. Peña-
Irala.36  Filártiga established the precedent of reading the ATS 
broadly to allow a suit by an alien against another alien 
government official.37  Multinational corporations and 
economists who oppose this broad interpretation of the ATS 
emphasize the potential negative effects on commerce and on 
corporate defendants.38  The ATS is now a part of an 
increasingly heated international debate over the utility and 
desirability of extraterritorial jurisdiction.39  To address the 
modern purposes of the ATS, a review of the theories of the 
origin and intended purposes of the Statute is in order. 
A. Theories of the Origin and Purposes of the Alien Tort 
Statute 
Scholars and historians have put forth several theories 
to explain the original purposes of the ATS.40  There is no 
consensus on a single theory,41 but all theories of the original 
purposes of the ATS share the notion that the ATS’s drafters 
were concerned with the protection of a young nation in an 
unstable international political climate.42  This Note now 
examines three of the prominent theories of the ATS’s origin, 
the denial of justice theory, the diplomatic safety theory, and 
the international duty theory. 
  
2003) (reviewing in detail the economic damage that may result from broadening use of 
the Alien Tort Statute). 
 36 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see, e.g., Anne-Marie 
Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 461, 461 (1989). 
 37 See Willett, supra note 34, at 16. 
 38 See, e.g., HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 35, at 37-43 (arguing that 
ATS suits will inhibit trade and foreign direct investment). 
 39 Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The 
question of defining ‘the law of nations’ is a confusing one which is hotly debated, 
chiefly among academics.”); see, e.g., HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 35 
(estimating the potential economic impact of ATS litigation); Emika Duruigbo, The 
Economic Cost of Alien Tort Litigation: A Response to Awakening Monster: The Alien 
Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 2 (2004) (responding to Hufbauer and 
Mitrokostas). 
 40 See Burley, supra note 36, at 464, 469, 475, 481. 
 41 Id. at 463 (“[B]attle has been joined on this ground [the history of the 
Statute], giving rise to a new paper chase through the legislative history of the First 
Judiciary Act, the constitutional debates, the Founders’ papers and the proceedings of 
the Continental Congress.”). 
 42 See id. at 464 (“All the existing theories about the historical origins of the 
statute essentially depict it as part of the protective armor designed to shield a young 
and vulnerable nation in a dangerous and unpredictable world.”). 
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1. The Denial of Justice Theory 
“Denial of justice” is an antiquated legal term referring 
to a nation’s denial to non-citizens of access to – and fair 
process in – that nation’s courts.43  Historically (and to some 
degree, currently), a nation that commits a denial of justice is 
responsible to pay damages to the injured non-citizen’s 
nation.44  Proponents of the denial of justice theory note that at 
the time of its enactment, the drafters may have intended the 
ATS to provide a vent for tensions between foreign nations and 
the fledgling United States, then a relatively weak and 
disorganized nation.45  This theory posits that the drafters were 
responding to concerns about the escalation of a civil wrong 
into international tension.  That is, denial of access to the court 
system to an alien injured in America could set off a chain of 
events eventually leading to armed conflict.  At the time, 
Alexander Hamilton saw such an escalation to war as a 
reasonable response to a denial of justice.46 
The leap from an injured alien to a declaration of war 
may seem unlikely today, as the United States is now in a 
vastly different political and economic position.47  However, 
  
 43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 711 cmt. a (1987). 
 44 The current Restatement of Foreign Relations still, though narrowly, 
recognizes denial of justice as an injury.  Id. (“[T]he phrase ‘denial of justice’ is used 
narrowly, to refer only to injury consisting of, or resulting from, denial of access to 
courts, or denial of procedural fairness and due process in relation to judicial 
proceedings, whether criminal or civil.”); id. at reporter’s n.2 (“Before the development 
of the contemporary law of human rights, states were held responsible for injury to 
aliens consisting of, or resulting from, various acts or omissions deemed to violate an 
international standard of justice or other standards accepted in customary 
international law.”). 
 45 Burley, supra note 36, at 465. 
 46 Hamilton suggests in The Federalist No. 80 that a grant of federal 
jurisdiction over cases concerning aliens would diminish the possibility of such an 
escalation: 
The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct 
of its members.  And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be 
accompanied with the faculty of preventing it.  As the denial or perversion of 
justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with 
reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal 
judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other 
countries are concerned.  This is not less essential to the preservation of the 
public faith, than to the security of the public tranquility.  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 500-01 (Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed., 1961). 
 47 See James Thuo Gathii, Foreign and Other Economic Rights Upon 
Conquest and Under Occupation Iraq in Comparative and Historical Context, 25 U. PA. 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 491, 506 & n.55 (2004) (“The best statement of American hegemony 
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there may be relevant modern analogs of Hamilton’s concern.48  
While miltary conflict with established world powers no longer 
poses the imminent threat to the United States that it did in 
the eighteenth century, a denial of justice today might lead to 
terrorist retribution and non-war civilian casualties.49 
2. The Diplomatic Safety Theory 
The diplomatic safety theory is a narrower variant of 
the denial of justice theory.  The diplomatic safety theory 
argues that Congress enacted the ATS to provide access to 
courts specifically for other nations’ diplomats.50  This view is 
supported by Blackstone’s Commentaries (written contempora-
neously with the enactment of the ATS) which states that 
“[i]nfringement of the rights of embassadors” was one of three 
“principal offences against the law of nations[.]”51  Thus, the 
ATS would help protect ambassadors’ rights, which would 
avoid international tension caused by a violations of a principal 
international offense.52 
Historical research suggests that one episode in 
particular, the “Marbois Affair,” may have sparked political 
interest in the protection of ambassadors.53  In 1784, the 
  
begins with the proclamation that ‘[t]he United States possesses unprecedented- and 
unequaled-strength and influence in the world.’”) (quoting NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, 
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 (2002)). 
 48 See supra note 44. 
 49 Part IV.A.2 infra discusses these modern threats in greater detail. 
 50 See Burley, supra note 36, at 469 (referring to the ATS as an “Ambassador 
Protection Plan”). 
 51 5 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF 
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 68 (1803). 
  Judge Bork relies in part on the diplomatic safety theory in his 
concurrence in a 1984 ATS case.  Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813-
14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (“The principal offences against the law of 
nations, animadverted on as such by the municipal laws of England, [were] of three 
kinds: 1. Violation of safeconducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of embassadors; and, 
3. Piracy.”) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 68, 72, quoted in W.W. 
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 459 
(1953)); see also id. at 779 (Edwards, J., concurring) (quoting same passage with trivial 
spelling variation from 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 67 (Welsby ed. 1854)).  
The Tel-Oren concurrences are discussed further infra Part II.B.2. 
 52 As further evidence of the importance of diplomatic safety in the 
eighteenth century, the U.S. Constitution grants original Supreme Court jurisdiction 
over cases involving ambassadors.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cls. 1, 2. 
 53 See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over 
Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 491-94 
(1986) (discussing the history of the events of the Marbois affair and their connection to 
the enactment of the ATS). 
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Chevalier De Longchamps insulted Francis Barbe Marbois, the 
French Consul-General, in Pennsylvania, which led to a public 
argument and assault in the streets of Philadelphia.54  No 
federal courts existed at the time of the Marbois affair.  Thus, 
the federal government, though ostensibly responsible for 
international diplomacy, was unable to resolve a simple assault 
case to protect the honor of a diplomat.  This federal impotence 
led to international outrage, including formal protests from 
foreign diplomats and American politicians; it demonstrated 
the United States’ need for a federal court system.55  So, this 
theory goes, Congress enacted the ATS to prevent further 
incidents like the Marbois Affair and their ensuing 
international backlash.56 
3. The International Duty Theory 
As an alternative to the cluster of interrelated national 
defense theories, Professor Burley (now Dean Slaughter) 
posited that it was a higher sense of international duty – not 
self-preservation – that moved the ATS’s drafters.57  The 
international duty theory suggests that “the country was ready 
to shoulder a perceived national duty to enforce international 
law as it related to individual conduct.”58  Some originalists 
  
 54 Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 111 (1784) (“[I]t 
appeared, that De Longchamps and Monsieur Marbois . . . entered into a long 
conversation, in the course of which, the latter said that he would complain to the civil 
authority, and the former replied, ‘you are a Blackguard.’”); Casto, supra note 53, at 
491. 
 55 See Casto, supra note 53, at 491 & n.138.  Eventually, a Pennsylvania 
state court tried and convicted the Chevalier of criminal technical assault – in violation 
of the law of nations.  De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 117. 
 56 See Casto, supra note 53, at 492-95 (describing the effect of the Marbois 
Affair on American society, politics, and legislation).  But see Burley, supra note 36, at 
469-73 (criticizing the diplomatic safety theory and concluding that the Alien Tort 
Statute could not have been motivated by ambassadorial protection because the only 
suit brought to defend Marbois’ honor was a criminal suit, not civil, as is a tort suit).  
Indeed, Blackstone noted that suits to vindicate ambassadorial rights were criminal 
common-law suits.  See Casto, supra note 53, at 489-90 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *67, *70-71 (1783)); see also Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burr. 1478, 97 Eng. 
Rep. 936, 938 (K.B. 1764) (upholding diplomatic immunity as part of the common law 
of England in a case argued by Blackstone and decided by Judge Mansfield); The 
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and 
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate 
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for 
their determination.”). 
 57 See generally Burley, supra note 36, at 475-88. 
 58 Courtney Shaw, Note, Uncertain Justice: Liability of Multinationals Under 
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 54 STAN. L. REV., 1359, 1364 (2002). 
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argue that the term “law of nations” included only rules 
governing relations among nations (and not between 
individuals and nations) and so the intent of the ATS’s drafters 
could not have been to include suits to protect individual 
rights.59  The international duty theory acknowledges that the 
prevailing view of international law in 1789 may have been 
limited to nations only, but asserts that the drafters, moved by 
a sense of duty, nevertheless intended the ATS to allow 
international law to be applicable by individuals.60  That is, the 
drafters intended to allow any alien – not only ambassadors – 
to utilize the federal courts to redress their injuries.61  The 
international duty view sees this early willingness to enforce 
international law as “a badge of honor” for our young nation.62 
With these theories in mind, it remains unclear which, 
if any, of these views of the ATS courts have adopted.  
However, recent case law reflects a more expansive view of the 
ATS than would be suggested by the denial of justice or 
diplomatic safety theories.63  Courts’ willingness to interpret 
the ATS to include the rights of individuals is more compatible 
with the international duty theory than with the other 
theories.64  The next section of this Note will review modern 
case law, legislation, and commentary on the ATS. 
  
 59 See David F. Klein, A Theory for the Application of the Customary 
International Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 332, 340 
(1988); Beth Stephens, Accountability Without Hypocrisy: Consistent Standards, 
Honest History, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 919, 922 (2002) (“Most international law before 
World War II had governed interactions among states and their governments.”).  Since 
World War II, the international community often refers to the rules governing 
interactions among nations as “public international law.” 
  Since international law (or the law of nations, as it was then called) at the 
time of the ATS’s enactment had little place for individuals’ rights, originalists take the 
position that the ATS should be narrowly interpreted to exclude suits that vindicate 
individual rights transnationally.  See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 
813-14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). 
 60 Burley, supra note 36, at 475 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 881 (G. Chase 4th ed. 1923)). 
 61 This view is actually a type of originalist view in which the original facts 
are in dispute.  Judge Bork’s construction asserts that the prevailing view of 
international law was limited to nations and that the ATS’s drafters meant the ATS to 
accord with that view.  Professor Burley suggests that the prevailing view was not as 
narrow as some assert, or that even if it was so narrow, the drafters deviated from this 
prevailing view to go above and beyond their duty to comply with the prevailing narrow 
view of international law.  Id. at 477. 
 62 Id. at 464. 
 63 See Willett, supra note 34, at 3. 
 64 Id. (“[T]hat the new nation ‘was ready to shoulder a perceived national 
duty to enforce international law as it related to individual conduct’ . . . .  resonates in 
the modern-day lawsuits instituted under the Alien Tort Statute.”). 
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B. Modern Applications of the Alien Tort Statute 
As previously mentioned, the ATS remained essentially 
unnoticed for almost two centuries.65  After World War II, the 
global community’s view of international law changed.66  The 
scope of international law expanded to include laws governing 
the relationships between states and individuals and between 
individuals of different nations.67  Utilizing this new conception 
of international law, alien plaintiffs began to sue in U.S. 
district courts under the ATS.68  These plaintiffs enjoyed little 
success until courts and scholars took notice of the ATS’s 
potential as a human rights enforcement tool.69  In 1980, a 
Paraguayan father and daughter brought the ATS into the 
spotlight by suing an official of the militaristic Paraguayan 
government for the wrongful death of their son/brother.70  The 
Second Circuit’s decision in that case, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 
began a debate that has since greatly broadened the ATS’s 
applicability.71  Before Filártiga, courts read the ATS narrowly; 
  
 65 A database search on the ATS returned about ten scholarly articles 
published before 1980.  Approximately 1300 articles are now available, over 1100 of 
which were published within the last ten years.  A database search of cases mentioning 
the ATS returns over 300 cases total, with about 200 of these decided in the last ten 
years, but only about two dozen cases before 1980.  Only two of these pre-1980 cases 
found jurisdiction under the ATS.  See infra note 72. 
 66 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law 
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 
831-32 (1997) (noting that the Nuremberg trials “shattered” the old conception of 
international law). 
 67 See Burley, supra note 36, at 490-93.  For a review of updates to the 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law that reflect this change in the content of 
“international law,” see infra note 77. 
 68 See, e.g., Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interamericana, S.A, 255 F. 
Supp. 919, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (dismissing the case where Greek plaintiff sought 
damages for an injury in violation of a maritime treaty); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv., 
Inc., 475 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1973) (affirming summary judgment for defendants 
because Nigerian plaintiffs alleging violations of the Thirteenth Amendment and 
international prohibitions against slavery failed to establish that labor was forced). 
 69 See, e.g., IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975); Thomas P. 
Crotty, Note, The Law of Nations in the District Courts: Federal Jurisdiction over Tort 
Claims by Aliens Under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, 1 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 71, 71 (1977). 
 70 See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 71 See id. at 887 (establishing that the ATS provides jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial suits); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)  
(per curiam) (interpreting the ATS narrowly and providing three divergent rationales 
in concurrences); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) 
(reinterpreting the ATS broadly and partially refuting the Tel-Oren reasoning), 
reconsideration granted in part by 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (mem.); see also 
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366 
(1991) (“In Filártiga, transnational public law litigants finally found their Brown v. 
Board of Education.”) (citation omitted). 
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only two pre-Filártiga cases allowed jurisdiction under the 
ATS.72  Since Filártiga, human rights plaintiffs have frequently 
asserted jurisdiction under the ATS.73  Recent cases brought 
under the ATS tend to seek redress for violations of treaties 
such as the Geneva Conventions or for violation of general 
international norms such as those proscribing torture, slavery, 
and genocide.74 
1. Early ATS Cases Used the Narrow Interpretation 
Initially, almost no court held that the ATS granted 
jurisdiction over extraterritorial torts.75  While the effect of the 
ATS was clear – that district courts have jurisdiction over cases 
alleging violations of the “law of nations” – its scope was not.  
The content of the “law of nations,”76 now commonly referred to 
  
 72 See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863-65 (D. Md. 1961) (regarding child 
custody dispute between aliens in which a falsified passport provided the violation of 
international law); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.C.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) 
(concerning title to slaves aboard an enemy ship captured at sea); see also Randall, 
supra note 32 (reporting that the ATS had been invoked only twenty-one times before 
Filártiga, and jurisdiction granted only twice); Kontorovich, supra note 30, at 202 & 
n.111 (discussing Bolchos and noting the progression from “only faint glimmerings of 
universal jurisdiction” to the formal recognition of universal jurisdiction in Filártiga). 
 73 See infra note 122 for examples of scholarly articles highlighting the 
human rights potential of the ATS. 
 74 For examples of cases seeking to vindicate international human rights 
norms, see infra notes 118-20, 122-30, and accompanying text. 
 75 See supra note 72 for a review of these cases; see also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 
792-93 & n.24 (Edwards, J., concurring) (discussing the pre-Filártiga narrowness of the 
ATS); Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law 
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1, 7 & n.12 (2002) (noting the rare use of ATS before Filártiga). 
 76 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005).  The debate over extraterritorial jurisdiction is 
lively.  See, e.g., Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(noting the debate among academics regarding the ATS).  But see Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 366 (E.D. La. 1997) (“The current view of § 1350 is 
that it grants a federal cause of action as well as a federal forum in which to assert the 
claim. . . .  [S]ection 1350 is appropriately used by individuals asserting claims for 
violation of international law of human rights.”) (citations omitted), aff’d, 197 F.3d 161 
(5th Cir. 1999). 
  Two camps have emerged with interpretations of the ATS that advance 
their causes.  On one side, human rights advocates, scholars, and practitioners support 
a “cause of action” interpretation.  They argue that the ATS provides both jurisdiction 
and a cause of action, or, alternatively, that it allows the cause of action to be found in 
domestic tort law, customary international law, or in the domestic tort law of a foreign 
nation.  See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding 
Congressional intent to broaden the ATS and Congressional approval of courts’ 
interpretations to include a cause of action in the ATS); Casto, supra note 53, at 471-72 
(advocating that the ATS “should be construed as liberally as possible”). 
  The opposition, including international corporate interests and economists, 
tends toward a jurisdiction-only interpretation.  That is, they read the ATS narrowly to 
grant jurisdiction over cases brought with an independent cause of action.  See, e.g., 
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as international law, was uncertain at best.  Thus, the primary 
limitation on the ATS’s scope was courts’ narrow interpretation 
of the term “law of nations.” 
The law of nations has its origins in governing the 
relationships among national governments.77  As a type of 
“international common law,” its boundaries and requirements 
are rooted in customary protocols and the practical necessities 
of dealing with other nations.78  This narrow conception of 
international law does not leave room for individual rights.79  
Thus, an interpretation of the ATS relying on this narrow 
conception would reject many modern ATS cases that have 
been successful.  For example, courts interpreting “law of 
nations” narrowly would not have subject matter jurisdiction 
over a suit brought by a Panamanian citizen against an 
American corporation alleging labor abuses amounting to 
torture.  Since the body of law that dictates relationships 
among nations does not control this hypothetical suit (because 
the plaintiff is not a nation, but an individual citizen), the suit 
would fail.  The modern conception of international law is 
broader; it recognizes the rights of individuals as within the 
scope of international law.80  This broader conception was a 
gradual change that crystallized after World War II.81 
The legal fallout of the atrocities committed in Nazi 
Germany effectively internationalized certain broadly-
  
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810 (Bork, J., concurring) (“[T]his provision . . . is merely a 
jurisdiction-granting statute and not the implementing legislation required by non-self-
executing treaties to enable individuals to enforce their provisions.”). 
 77 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1 (1965) (“‘International law,’ as used in the Restatement of this Subject, 
means those rules of law applicable to a state or international organization that cannot 
be modified unilaterally by it.”).  The definition of international law changed in the 
Third Restatement to acknowledge the growing understanding that international law 
could affect the rights of individuals.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 101  (“International law . . . consists of rules 
and principles of general application dealing with the conduct of states and of 
international organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of 
their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.”) (emphasis added), id. § 101 
reporter’s n.1 (explaining the change from the previous Restatement) (1987).   
  For purposes of this discussion, the term “international law” will be used 
interchangeably with the term “law of nations” used in the ATS.  28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 78 This is traditionally referred to as “customary international law.”  See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. c 
(1987). 
 79 See id. § 101, reporter’s n.1 (1987). 
 80 Id. § 101. 
 81 See Stephens, supra note 59, at 922-23 (noting changes in international 
law precipitated by World War II). 
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recognized human rights standards.82  The short list of 
internationally acknowledged inderogable norms referred to as 
jus cogens encompasses the worst of these atrocities.83  This list 
is informal, but some of its contents are undisputed: 
prohibitions against piracy, torture, and genocide, for example, 
are all well-accepted jus cogens norms.84  One contested item 
that some argue to be on this list is terrorism.  While most 
authorities agree that the international community universally 
prohibits terrorism, the specific activities that are included in 
terrorism remain undefined.85 
Prior to 1980, courts interpreted the ATS using the 
narrow conception of international law as the meaning of “law 
of nations,” which preserved the ATS’s obscurity.86  The Statute 
“awoke” in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala when the Second Circuit 
used the broad conception of the ATS to allow individual claims 
against violators of international law.87 
2. Filártiga Broadened the Alien Tort Statute’s Scope 
Professor Harold Koh referred to Filártiga v. Peña-Irala 
as the Brown v. Board of Education of transnational public 
  
 82 Id. 
 83 See, e.g., PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE 
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 29 (2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON 
PRINCIPLES] (“For purposes of these Principles, serious crimes under international law 
include: (1) piracy; (2) slavery; (3) war crimes; (4) crimes against peace; (5) crimes 
against humanity; (6) genocide; and (7) torture.”), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf; Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus 
Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 
413-14 (1989) (“Most areas of great human rights concern – illegal treaties, 
humanitarian (armed conflict) law, apartheid, genocide, torture, violations of the right 
to life and the plight of refugees – are governed by jus cogens.”). 
 84 See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173-74 (1994) 
(reviewing jus cogens and its relationship to foreign sovereign immunity).  The 
Restatement of Foreign Relations includes, inter alia, state-sponsored torture, slavery, 
genocide, and disappearance as violations of international law.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987); see also id. cmt. c (“The 
customary law of human rights is part of the law of the United States to be applied as 
such by State as well as federal courts.”). 
 85 See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 83 (noting the drafters’ exclusion of 
terrorism).  Terrorism has resisted precise definition.  Though actions may be 
described – or, unfortunately, recounted – that are universally agreeably terroristic, 
there remains no standard to determine whether any given action is terroristic.  That 
is, until a better definition is stated, the international community will have to know 
terrorism when it sees it. 
 86 See supra note 72. 
 87 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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law.88  The Filártiga court combined a modern interpretation of 
the “law of nations” with the very old Alien Tort Statute to 
arrive at the conclusion that the district courts could hear 
extraterritorial claims.  Thus, the court found that it had 
jurisdiction over the case, setting precedent that made the 
possibility of redress available to similarly situated plaintiffs 
everywhere.89 
The plaintiffs in this case were Dr. Joel Filártiga and 
his daughter, both Paraguayan asylum seekers in the United 
States.  They brought their wrongful death suit against 
defendant Americo Peña, a Paraguayan police official in the 
militaristic government of President Alfredo Stroessner.90  The 
plaintiffs accused Peña of involvement in the death by torture 
of Joelito Filártiga, Dr. Filártiga’s son, in political retaliation 
for Dr. Filártiga’s opposition to the Stroessner government.91  
The district court below had dismissed the case for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction by adopting the narrow meaning of 
“law of nations.”92  The district court reasoned that 
international law or the law of nations referred only to those 
laws governing relations among nations (this body of law is 
now called “public international law”).93  The Second Circuit 
found this view of “international law” to be unacceptably 
narrow, so it rejected the district court’s narrow construction 
and opened the door to the expansive use of the ATS today.94 
The Filártiga court went on to broadly construe the 
ATS’s reference to international law.95  The court recognized 
that modern international law governs the relationship 
between a government and its citizens.96  It thus held that the 
plain language of the ATS granted jurisdiction over a cause of 
  
 88 See Koh, supra note 71, at 2366 (“In Filártiga, transnational public law 
litigants finally found their Brown v. Board of Education.”) (citation omitted). 
 89 See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 879, 888-89.  The Filártiga plaintiffs eventually 
won a ten-million-dollar damages judgment.  Id. 
 90 Id. at 878. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 880. 
 94 In overturning the district court’s narrow interpretation, the Second 
Circuit noted that the district court founded that narrow interpretation on dicta from 
two Second Circuit cases.  Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 880. 
 95 Id. at 881 (“[C]ourts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, 
but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.”).  The Supreme 
Court would later adopt a sympathetic view in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 
(2004), discussed infra. 
 96 Id. at 888-89. 
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action in tort in violation of international law, and that torture 
was such a violation.97  Since Filártiga, the general trend in 
ATS litigation has been expansive.98  This trend, however, has 
not been without interruption.  A District of Columbia Circuit 
Court opinion posed a significant threat to Filártiga’s rationale. 
Dismissing the plaintiffs’ case in Tel-Oren v. Libyan 
Arab Republic, a D.C. Circuit three-judge panel disapproved of 
the Filártiga court’s reasoning.99  The Tel-Oren plaintiffs were 
mainly bus passengers and surviving families of passengers 
who were injured or killed in an armed attack against a civilian 
bus in Israel.100  The district court below had dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ case against those allegedly responsible for the 
murder of their relatives.101  On appeal, the plaintiffs 
maintained that the ATS provided jurisdiction for their claims 
because the defendants’ actions constituted a violation of 
international law, as the Filártiga court had defined it.102  The 
D.C. Circuit upheld the dismissal in a very brief opinion, but 
each member of the three-judge panel wrote a substantial 
concurring opinion founded on largely independent grounds 
from the others.  Judge Edwards’ concurrence agreed with the 
principles established in Filártiga, but distinguished Tel-Oren 
on its facts.103  Judge Bork’s concurrence agreed with the 
district court’s reasoning in its dismissal – because the ATS did 
not itself supply a private cause of action, the plaintiffs had 
  
 97 Id. at 880, 890.  The Torture Victim Protection Act later explicitly 
established a corresponding cause of action to enforce the right.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 98 For examples of the cases that have followed in the Filártiga chain, see 
infra notes 118-20, 122-30, and accompanying text. 
 99 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(Bork, J., concurring) (“Judge Edwards contends, and the Second Circuit in Filártiga 
assumed, that Congress’ grant of jurisdiction also created a cause of action.  That 
seems to me fundamentally wrong and certain to produce pernicious results.”). 
 100 Id. at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 789-91 (Edwards, J., concurring) (discussing the appropriate scope of 
the ATS, i.e., whether it should be read broadly to supply a cause of action or strictly to 
supply jurisdiction only). 
 103 Id. at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring).  Edwards agreed with the Second 
Circuit that the ATS conferred jurisdiction over suits alleging violations of substantive 
international law.  Id. at 777-78 (“The Second Circuit did not require plaintiffs to point 
to a specific right to sue under the law of nations in order to establish jurisdiction 
under section 1350; rather, the Second Circuit required only a showing that the 
defendant’s actions violated the substantive law of nations.”).  However, he reasoned 
that there was no firm consensus on the content of international law.  He felt that 
without further clarification from the Supreme Court, courts should not apply the ATS 
to groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization because they do not operate as 
state actors or under color of state law.  Id. at 791-95 (“Against this background, I do 
not believe the consensus on non-official torture warrants an extension of Filártiga.”). 
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failed to show a cause of action.104  Judge Robb differed from 
both of his colleagues, holding briefly that he found the case to 
be a nonjusticiable political question.105  Though in 1991 
Congress provided some guidance regarding ATS 
interpretation, the broad view of the ATS (shared by the 
Second Circuit, Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit, and others) 
would remain at odds with Judge Bork’s Tel-Oren opinion for 
years to come.106 
  
 104 Id. at 800-01 (Bork, J., concurring).  This is the “jurisdiction-only” view of 
the ATS.  In order for the Tel-Oren case to proceed, Bork thought that the plaintiffs 
would need to state an independent cause of action.  Id. at 800 & n.5.  By likening 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (granting federal jurisdiction to disputes arising under inter alia treaties 
of the United States) to § 1350, the district court found that the ATS granted only 
jurisdiction, but did not include a private cause of action.  Id. at 800.  Thus, according 
to Bork, plaintiffs would need a treaty granting a private cause of action for the case to 
proceed.  Judge Bork then held that since none of the treaties cited by the plaintiffs 
created an express or implied cause of action, the district court had properly dismissed 
the case. 
  Judge Bork also noted that federal adjudication could interfere with 
American diplomatic efforts, a concern that parallels the political question rationale 
adopted in Judge Robb’s concurrence.  Bork felt that these questions were essentially 
diplomatic in nature and thus inappropriate for judicial scrutiny.  Id. at 805. 
 105 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823 (Robb, J., concurring) (“But both Judges Bork 
and Edwards fail to reflect on the inherent inability of federal courts to deal with cases 
such as this one.  It seems to me that the political question doctrine controls.  This case 
is nonjusticiable.”).  Judge Robb lamented that the federal courts could not help future 
plaintiffs “maimed or murdered at the hands of thugs clothed with power who are 
unfortunately present in great numbers in the international order.”  Id.  He condemned 
the attack as “barbarity in naked and unforgivable form,” but felt that the courts 
should not attempt to determine whether individual acts of aggression amount to 
violations of international law.  Id. (“Courts ought not to engage in [the search for the 
least common denominators of civilized conduct] when that search takes us towards a 
consideration of terrorism’s place in the international order.”).  Robb opined that 
drawing lines between acceptable state actions and unacceptable terrorism was not an 
appropriate task for the judiciary. 
 106 See, e.g., Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 242-47 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (reviewing Filártiga, Tel-Oren, and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 
1991, and concluding that “neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has definitively 
resolved the complex and controversial questions regarding the meaning and scope of 
the [ATS].”); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1538-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987) 
(discussing and rejecting the Tel-Oren concurrences of Judges Bork and Robb, and 
finding jurisdiction over a suit brought by Argentinean citizens living in the United 
States against a former Argentinean general for kidnapping and torturing their son to 
death as part of a national security operation in Argentina’s “dirty war”), reconsidered 
in part by Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that 
plaintiffs had shown sufficient agreement among nations to establish a cause of action 
in international law for the tort of “causing disappearance”).  The Supreme Court 
eventually considered the appropriate breadth of the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692 (2004), discussed infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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3. The Torture Victim Protection Act Supports the 
Expansive Interpretation 
The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”) was 
the first substantive change to the ATS since its enactment.107  
The TVPA did not change the statutory text of the ATS, but 
added a note defining torture and extrajudicial killing108 and 
establishing a cause of action under the ATS for aliens to 
remedy those offenses.109  Congress enacted the TVPA in order 
to comply with the United Nations Charter and other 
international treaties.110  The note added by the TVPA instructs 
courts that torture and extrajudicial killings constitute offenses 
in violation of international law.111  Thus, the TVPA is an 
advisory corollary to the ATS explicitly granting jurisdiction 
over tort cases brought by aliens seeking to redress torture or 
  
 107 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2005)).  The previous amendments and re-
codifications were essentially administrative, not substantive.  They merely changed 
the wording of the ATS from its original text to reflect modernized legal terms.  See 
Bradley, supra note 7. 
 108 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 3. 
 109 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(a)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 
2(a)(1) (“An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any 
foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for 
damages to that individual . . . .”); see also Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 245-46 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (discussing and applying the TVPA and noting that the ATS may also be 
applied to non-state-actor defendants). 
 110 The stated purpose of the act was “[t]o carry out obligations of the United 
States under the United Nations Charter and other international agreements 
pertaining to the protection of human rights by establishing a civil action for recovery 
of damages from an individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.”  Torture 
Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, 73.  Congress’ 
statement of the rationale underlying the TVPA evinces the international duty theory 
of the ATS’s enactment in 1789, see supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text, and 
affirms that theory’s applicability to modern times. 
  One of the “international agreements” to which the law refers is probably 
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. 
No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51/Annex (1984).  See also U.N. CHARTER art. 55 (“[T]he United 
Nations shall promote: . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.”). 
 111 Before the TVPA, the federal district courts were fragmented on whether 
torture was a sufficient cause of action.  See, e.g., Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 
835 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1988) (“‘Official torture’ has been recognized as an 
actionable tort under the Alien Tort Statute in some jurisdictions and not in others.”).  
The TVPA, perhaps in response to this fragmentation, made clear that torture gives 
rise to a cause of action under the ATS.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a)(1) (“An individual 
who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign 
nation . . . subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages 
to that individual . . . .”). 
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extrajudicial killing.  Additionally, the TVPA is a 
Congressional acknowledgment and approval of the ATS’s use 
for human rights enforcement.112  At least some courts have 
interpreted the enactment of the TVPA as legislative 
permission, if not a mandate, to continue expansion of the 
ATS’s breadth.113  Thus, the TVPA served as a booster shot for 
the ATS’s growing scope.  This expansive view of the ATS has 
continued through a string of suits against individual 
government officials (not the governments themselves) and 
against multi-national corporations. 
4. Post-Filártiga Applications Rely on the Expansive 
Interpretation 
The most recent applications of the ATS have involved 
international human rights enforcement.  The plaintiffs in 
these cases filed ATS suits to redress human rights abuses by 
multinational corporations,114 abuses by government actors,115 
  
 112 See 137 CONG. REC. H11244 (1991) (“[T]he Torture Victim Protection Act, 
H.R. 2092, puts torturers on notice that they will find no safe haven in the United 
States.  Torturers may be sued under the bill if they seek the protection of our shores 
or otherwise subject themselves to the personal jurisdiction of a U.S. court.”) 
(comments of Romano L. Mazzoli, D-Ky.).  The TVPA’s legislative history echoes the 
Second Circuit’s statement in Filártiga that “for purposes of civil liability, the torturer 
has become – like the pirate and slave trader before him – hostis humani generis, an 
enemy of all mankind.”  630 F.2d at 890. 
 113 Judge Hatchett, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel of the Eleventh 
Circuit, affirmed a decision by District Judge Tidwell awarding damages against a 
former Ethiopian government official involved in the plaintiffs’ detention, torture, and 
disappearance: 
Lastly, we find support for our holding in the recently enacted Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA).  In enacting the TVPA, Congress endorsed the 
Filártiga line of cases: 
The TVPA would establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a 
cause of action that has been successfully maintained under an 
existing law, section 1350 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Alien 
Tort Claims Act), which permits Federal district courts to hear 
claims by aliens for torts committed “in violation of the law of 
nations.” 
Congress, therefore, has recognized that the Alien Tort Claims Act confers 
both a forum and a private right of action to aliens alleging a violation of 
international law. 
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted) (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86).  This 
language is also an example of the “cause of action” interpretation of the Statute.  See 
supra note 76. 
 114 See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2005); 
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Doe v. 
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or abuses by government contractors, the topic of this Note.116  
One class of these cases involves plaintiffs subjected to human 
rights violations committed in connection with multinational 
corporations’ labor practices.117  For example, the ATS was the 
jurisdictional vehicle for a series of high-profile cases brought 
against the multinational petroleum conglomerate Unocal for 
its use of forced labor in the “Yadana Project” in Burma.118  A 
group of Indonesian citizens filed a similar case in the District 
of Columbia against ExxonMobil Corporation, alleging murder, 
torture, rape, and genocide committed by the Indonesian 
  
Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1295-96 (C.D. Cal. 2000), appeal dismissed per 
stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 115 See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995); Chiminya 
Tachiona v. Mugabe, 216 F. Supp. 2d 262, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Plaintiffs alleged that 
ZANU-PF [Zimbabwe National Union-Patriotic Front], in an effort to suppress political 
opposition, and acting in concert with Mugabe and other high-ranking Zimbabwe 
government officials, carried out a campaign of violence against them that included 
extra-judicial killing, torture, seizure of property and terrorizing.”). 
  Frequently, human rights groups such as the Center for Constitutional 
Rights (“CCR”) represent the injured plaintiffs, as they did in Filártiga.  For a list of 
cases in which the CCR has participated, see Center for Constitutional Rights, 
International Human Rights, http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/human_rights 
/human_rights.asp (last visited Sept. 2, 2005).  The CCR has taken an active role in 
promoting investigations of the Abu Ghraib abuse scandals, as well.  After a court-
martial sentenced Specialist Charles Graner for his involvement in the abuse, the CCR 
“responded to the Graner verdict by calling for a special prosecutor to investigate Mr. 
Rumsfeld’s role in creating policies that governed treatment of prisoners.”  Kate 
Zernike, High-Ranking Officers May Face Prosecution in Iraqi Prisoner Abuse, Military 
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at 8. 
 116 See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(naming private contractor-corporations operating in the government’s Abu Ghraib 
detention facility as defendants); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1088 (S.D. 
Cal. 2004) (same); Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 345-46 (D.N.J. 2004) (naming a 
private contractor-corporation operating a correctional facility as a defendant). 
 117 This class of cases often includes a collaborative effort between a local 
government and an offending multinational corporation.  See generally Tobias 
Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global Economy, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2002).  Plaintiffs have brought up to fifty such ATS suits against 
MNCs.  See Willett, supra note 34; Kenny Bruno, De-Globalizing Justice: The 
Corporate Campaign to Strip Foreign Victims of Corporate-Induced Human Rights 
Violations of the Right to Sue in U.S. Courts, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Mar. 2003, at 
13 (article written by ATS plaintiffs’ co-counsel reviewing the history of the ATS and 
discussing its modern human rights applications). 
 118 See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1295-96 (C.D. Cal. 
2000), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Collingsworth, 
supra note 5, at 186-95.  The Yadana Project involved the construction of an oil 
pipeline, a collaborative effort of Unocal, the militaristic Burmese government, and 
Total, a French oil company.  See id. at 184 n.15. 
  The Unocal plaintiffs based their suit on an at least expansive, if not 
creative, interpretation of the ATS, so corporations and human rights groups greatly 
anticipated the Unocal holding.  Unfortunately for the international legal community, 
the parties have tentatively agreed to a settlement, so the case will set no precedent 
after all.  Lisa Girion, Unocal to Settle Rights Claims, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at 1. 
1396 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:3 
military, then employed as the defendant’s security forces.119  In 
another recent example, labor unions brought actions against 
Coca-Cola in Columbia for paramilitary suppression of union 
activities.120  Though their outcomes are mixed, these cases 
illustrate the trend in use of the ATS as a human rights tool 
against corporations.121  Though scholars and practitioners 
have written a great deal on the topic,122 this Note will not deal 
extensively with the effectiveness of such suits against 
corporate defendants or the propriety of various types of cases.  
For present purposes, it is sufficient to show that a growing 
number of plaintiffs are using the ATS to combat human rights 
violations committed by international corporations.123 
Another class of cases brought under the ATS focuses on 
government officials.  These cases often seek to vindicate 
tortious violations of international law arising from oppression 
in unstable political conditions.124  For example, the Second 
  
 119 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 120 Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 121 Some argue that cases against multinational corporations stand to cause 
more economic harm than good.  See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 35.  Cf. 
Willett, supra note 34.  To minimize frivolous suits, however, courts have applied a 
more searching review before finding jurisdiction for cases under the ATS.  Kadic v. 
Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 
20, 24 (D.D.C. 2005).  This closer inspection of the plaintiffs’ claims is intended to 
ensure that an actual violation of international law has taken place, so ATS suits are 
less likely to be used as a harassment tactic.  Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238.  Further, these 
suits typically allege harms on the order of torture, murder, and slavery, so the rights 
infringed are more serious than those involved in garden-variety tort suits. 
 122 See, e.g., David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The 
Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 
VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 941-43, 961 (2004) (discussing standards applied in evaluating ATS 
liability); Pagnattaro, supra note 18, at 262-63 (emphasizing the global responsibility 
to make remedies available for human rights abuses); Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing 
Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating International Law, 4 UCLA J. 
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, 104-114, 143-47 (1999) (analyzing past ATS cases and 
suggesting cautious use of the ATS to provide remedies against multinational 
corporations).  But see, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret 
the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 68-69 (2004) (arguing against selective use of 
international materials in Constitutional interpretation and noting with respect to the 
ATS that America “stand[s] virtually alone in the world in creating a civil cause of 
action for human rights violations”); Kontorovich, supra note 30, at 202-03, 208-09 
(arguing that traditional universal jurisdiction rationales are inapplicable to support 
the ATS). 
 123 The specific circumstances under which such cases should be allowed is 
highly contentious and would be ill-addressed here.  This Note intends only to show the 
current uses of the ATS and presumes that among this class of cases are at least some 
instances of appropriate and beneficial litigation. 
 124 For examples, see infra notes 125-30.  The reader should note that the 
defendants in these suits are not the governments, but the individuals within the 
government responsible for the violation of international law.  The Foreign Sovereign 
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Circuit held that Bosnian victims could sue under the ATS for 
alleged genocide and torture committed by officers working for 
Radovan Karadžić, resulting in further expansion of the 
Statute.125  Similar cases against government officers have 
alleged human rights violations in the Philippines,126  
Ethiopia,127 Chile,128 Zimbabwe,129 and Mexico.130  Again, this 
Note deals with ATS cases against U.S. government 
contractors, so these ATS suits against foreign government 
actors are included to illustrate the broadening interpretation 
of the Statute. 
The debate over the appropriate scope of the ATS 
continues.131  The current U.S. government and some corporate 
defendants seem less supportive of a broadly-read Statute than 
  
Immunities Act controls federal jurisdiction over suits against governments.  See infra 
note 150. 
 125 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40.  Citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina brought a 
complaint against Karadžić, who was in command of Bosnian-Serb military forces, for 
various atrocities, including rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, and 
summary execution.  Id. at 236-37.  The Kadic court rejected the state action 
requirement that had proven fatal to the plaintiffs’ case in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  Kadic held instead that plaintiffs may sue 
individual actors in their personal capacities for violations of international law, i.e., 
that state action is not a necessary element of an ATS suit.  Id. at 239-40. 
 126 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).  Philippine 
nationals brought a claim against Ferdinand Marcos for human rights abuses, such as 
torture, summary execution, and “disappearance,” that occurred during his rule of the 
Philippines.  Id. at 771. 
 127 Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996).  Former prisoners in 
Ethiopia filed lawsuit against Negewo, an official of “the Dergue,” a military 
dictatorship governing Ethiopia in the mid-1970s, charging him with responsibility for 
their torture and other cruel acts in violation of international law.  Id. at 845-46. 
 128 Cabello Barrueto v. Fernández-Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 
2002).  The representative of an executed former Chilean official brought an ATS suit 
against a member of the Chilean military group responsible for his death.  In 1990, the 
Chilean Supreme Court granted amnesty to military officials who had committed 
human rights violations during the time of the execution.  Id. at 1327. 
 129 Chiminya Tachiona v. Mugabe, 216 F. Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
Plaintiffs brought a case under the ATS and Torture Victim Protection Act claiming 
the defendant participated with other Zimbabwean government officials in extra-
judicial killing, torture, seizure of property, and terrorizing.  Id. at 265. 
 130 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).  A Mexican national 
abducted and brought to the United States to be prosecuted for murder was acquitted 
and brought a suit under the ATS and Federal Tort Claims Act against the U.S. 
government, the DEA, and Mexican policemen and civilians.  Id. at 697.  The Supreme 
Court, however, found that under the Alien Tort Statute a single illegal detention of 
less than one day of a Mexican national was not a violation of any provable norm of 
customary international law.  Id. at 736-37 & n.27. 
 131 See, e.g., id. at 698-99; In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. 
Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Bruno, supra note 117 (describing the debate 
over broad or narrow interpretation of the ATS). 
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the Congress that enacted the TVPA.132  Case law, however, 
shows a judicial commitment to – or at least acceptance of – the 
expansive view of the ATS set forth in Filártiga.133 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain squarely confronted the issue of the ATS’s scope 
(though it hardly resolved the issue).134  Sosa clarified that the 
ATS not only provides jurisdiction, but also provides causes of 
action based on international norms if certain standards are 
met.135  The Court held that “[federal] courts should require any 
claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm 
of international character accepted by the civilized world and 
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 
18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”136 
Courts thus remain able to enforce international law, 
including human rights standards.137  This Note highlights one 
type of suit in which the ATS’s utility is threatened: ATS suits 
against U.S. government contractors.  A certain common law 
Defense protects government contractors from tort suits, 
undermining the ATS’s human rights potential.  The next part 
of this Note will explain this defense, its origins, the policies on 
  
 132 See Brief of Amici Curiae United States of America at 4, Doe I v. Unocal 
Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628 (9th Cir. May 8, 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/ 
press/2003/05/doj050803.pdf (arguing that Congress enacted the TVPA not to commend 
and encourage expansive interpretation, but to specify limited terms under which the 
suits should be allowable), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 
2005); cf. Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The Executive Branch 
has emphatically restated in this litigation its position that private persons may be 
found liable under the Alien Tort Act for acts of genocide, war crimes, and other 
violations of international humanitarian law.”). 
 133 See supra note 113 (illustrating the expansive view); see also Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004) (“It would take some explaining to say now 
that federal courts must avert their gaze entirely from any international norm 
intended to protect individuals.”). 
 134 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004). 
 135 Id. at 713-14. 
 136 Id. at 725.  The Court explained further that “federal courts should not 
recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any international 
law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the 
historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted.”  Id. at 732. 
  A footnote in Sosa noted, but did not address, the issue at the heart of this 
Note.  Id. at 732 n.20 (“A related consideration is whether international law extends 
the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the 
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”). 
 137 See id. at 729 (2004) (noting that with respect to judicially-created causes 
of action based on international norms, “the door is still ajar subject to vigilant 
doorkeeping”); Beth Stephens, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door Is Still 
Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 567 (2005) 
(noting that the Sosa decision limited the purposes for which the ATS may be used, but 
cemented its use for the most egregious violations of international norms); see also 
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); Willett, supra note 34, at 16-24. 
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which the Supreme Court founded it, and how defendants may 
raise it. 
III. BACKGROUND OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR 
DEFENSE 
The Defense is a federal common-law judicial doctrine 
that shields a contractor-defendant from liability when the 
federal government controlled its actions.138  The doctrine 
extends the federal government’s umbrella of sovereign 
immunity to protect those manufacturers who essentially acted 
as instruments of the government.139  The primary goal of the 
Defense is to protect government autonomy in procurement of 
goods through its contractors.140  Principles of agency and 
sovereign immunity are the foundation of the Defense’s 
rationale.141  Courts reason that suits against contractors would 
increase contractor costs and that contractors would pass these 
additional costs on to the government, which generally enjoys 
sovereign immunity to such suits.142  The Defense’s reasoning is 
that if the government is immune and a contractor is merely 
executing the will of the government, the contractor should be 
immune.143  Thus, the Defense holds that a manufacturer 
should not be held responsible for injuries caused by a defective 
product when the government directed the product’s design 
and manufacture.144 
From a policy perspective, the Defense stands to reason 
in certain typical situations.  In order to encourage 
participation in government contracts and encourage 
competition and an ample supply of available products and 
  
 138 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).  There is no 
statutory basis for the Defense; it is essentially a part of the federal common law.  Id. 
at 504 (“[W]e have held that a few areas, involving ‘uniquely federal interests,’ are so 
committed . . . to federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where 
necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by 
the courts – so-called ‘federal common law.’”) (citations omitted). 
 139 Id. at 512. 
 140 Id. at 511-12. 
 141 Id. at 524-25; see id. at 527-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 142 Id. at 510. 
 143 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12. 
 144 See Charles E. Cantu & Randy W. Young, The Government Contractor 
Defense: Breaking the Boyle Barrier, 62 ALB. L. REV. 403, 405-08 (1998) (reviewing the 
origins of the Defense); see also Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21 
(1940) (disallowing suit against a contractor whose construction work gave rise to a 
state claim for soil erosion on the theory that contractor was executing the will of 
Congress). 
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services, the Defense minimizes the liability burden that 
contractors must assume.145  This section will outline the 
foundations of the Defense and the reasoning in the case that 
established the Defense, Boyle v. United Technologies.146  Since 
the Defense is essentially an outgrowth of sovereign immunity, 
a brief discussion of sovereign immunity will help illuminate 
the policies underlying the Defense. 
A. Foreign and Domestic Sovereign Immunity 
Sovereign immunity has its roots in historical deference 
to state actions.147  Initially, government actors enjoyed broad 
immunity from judicial process.148  But as governments began 
to engage in less traditionally sovereign activities, the 
international community responded by limiting the doctrine.149 
There are two sides to sovereign immunity in American 
law, foreign and domestic.  Foreign sovereign immunity deals 
with the liability of foreign governments in domestic courts 
while domestic sovereign immunity deals with the liability of 
the federal and U.S. state governments in domestic courts.  The 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) codified the 
American approach to foreign sovereign immunity.150  Since 
  
 145 These policy implications of the Defense will be discussed more fully infra 
Part IV.A.1. 
 146 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
 147 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950). 
 148 See, e.g., Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 96 (1937) (“[N]o rule is better settled 
than that the United States cannot be sued except when Congress has so 
provided . . . .”). 
 149 A letter issued by Jack B. Tate of the State Department explained the 
“restrictive theory” of immunity and adopted that view as the position of the U.S. 
government.  Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to 
Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), in 26 Dep’t of State Bull. 
984-85 (1952), and in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15 
(1976). 
 150 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), and 1602-1611); 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2005) (“[A] 
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States 
and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”); see, e.g., 
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2005) (denying immunity from claims of state-sponsored 
terrorism).  But see Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 
438 (1989) (“We think that Congress’ decision to deal comprehensively with the subject 
of foreign sovereign immunity in the FSIA . . . preclude[s] a construction of the Alien 
Tort Statute that permits the instant suit.” (citations omitted)). 
  The reader should note that courts have interpreted the ATS to provide 
jurisdiction over individual government actors in their individual capacity, see Kadic v. 
Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1995), but not over the governments themselves.  
Courts have specifically excepted foreign governments from liability in ATS suits, 
noting that the FSIA controls these suits.  However, legal scholars and at least one 
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this Note focuses on the liability of contractors working for the 
U.S. government, the FSIA serves mainly as a point of 
reference.   
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) controls domestic 
tort immunity of the U.S. government.151  Again, history firmly 
established the default rule of state immunity; American 
common law adopted this rule as a part of our English 
heritage.152  This default remains in effect today; the U.S. 
government may not be sued without its permission.153  
However, Congress gave permission to sue for large classes of 
cases by enacting the FTCA, broadly waiving sovereign 
immunity subject to certain exceptions.154  Some important 
exceptions to the FTCA’s waiver of immunity retain immunity 
in situations likely to give rise to ATS suits.  For example, the 
government remains immune to claims arising in a foreign 
country155 and to claims related to military action.156  These 
exceptions and others prevent an injured alien from suing the 
U.S. government directly for the actions of its contractors 
under a theory of respondeat superior.157 
  
court have thought that courts should deny immunity (otherwise permitted under the 
FSIA) to rogue nations in order to hold the nation itself liable for heinous human rights 
violations.  See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (reversing the jurisdiction asserted by the District Court of the District of 
Columbia in a case brought by a Holocaust survivor against the German government 
for slave labor reparations).  The majority opinion was not entirely opposed to the 
reasoning of Judge Wald’s dissent.  Id. at 1174 n.1. 
 151 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (2005) (granting jurisdiction over claims 
against the United States government and limiting jurisdiction and damages in certain 
cases). 
 152 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 139. 
 153 See Fox, 300 U.S. at 96; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A(1) (1979) 
(“Except to the extent that the United States consents both to suit and to tort liability, 
it and its agencies are immune to the liability.”). 
 154 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A cmt. b (1979). 
 155 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2005). 
 156 Id. § 2680(j) (2005). 
 157 See Id. § 2680(a), (h), (j), (k) (2005) (retaining sovereign immunity for 
claims based on exercise of discretionary function by government employees, arising 
out of intentional torts, arising out of combatant activities, or arising in a foreign 
country, respectively); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 18-19 & n.6 (D.D.C. 
2005) (noting exceptions in the FTCA that might retain sovereign immunity in an ATS 
case). 
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B. The Boyle Rationale: Protect Government Autonomy 
with Private Immunity 
The Defense has no statutory foundation; it is a judicial 
creation.158  The Supreme Court recognized the Defense and 
adopted the test currently used to apply it in Boyle v. United 
Technologies.159  Boyle was a diversity action brought by family 
members of Boyle, a U.S. Marine helicopter copilot who 
drowned in a military exercise off the coast of Virginia.160  
When Boyle’s helicopter crashed into the ocean, the pressure of 
the surrounding water trapped Boyle inside, pushing the 
helicopter’s door hatch closed.161  Boyle’s family sued the 
manufacturer of the aircraft for, inter alia, negligence and 
breach of warranty in the hatch design.162  The district court 
awarded a jury verdict for plaintiffs, but the Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the “military 
contractor defense” barred the suit.163  On appeal, the Supreme 
Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit that military contractors 
should be protected, but based its opinion on a different 
rationale.164 
Without a waiver of the defense of sovereign immunity, 
of course, a case cannot proceed against the government.165  The 
Fourth Circuit reasoned in Boyle that since Feres protected the 
government from tort suits by military personnel, the same 
doctrine should also protect military contractors from liability 
to military personnel.166  That is, in order to protect the 
  
 158 Despite the urging of government contractors to legislate a defense for 
them, Congress remained “conspicuously silent” on the issue.  See Boyle v. United 
Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 515 n.1 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing a string of 
legislative hearings on the topic of indemnification of civil liability for government 
contractors). 
 159 See id. at 506-12. 
 160 See id. at 502-03. 
 161 Id.  The hatch only opened outward.  This was the design flaw for which 
Boyle’s survivors sought to hold the manufacturer responsible.  Id. at 503. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 503. 
 164 Id. at 512-13.  The Fourth Circuit had relied upon the doctrine established 
in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).  The Feres doctrine recognizes that the 
Federal Tort Claims Act does not waive sovereign immunity to military personnel 
injured in their military service.  Id. at 146.  Before Boyle, courts frequently used the 
Feres analysis in cases similar to Boyle.  Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510 (citing Bynum v. FMC 
Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565-66 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 596-
97 (7th Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
 165 See supra note 153. 
 166 See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Stencel 
Aero Eng’g. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977)) (“Such pass-through costs 
 
2006] ALIEN TORT STATUTE & GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS 1403 
government fully from the costs of injuries to military 
personnel, contractors should also be protected from these 
costs, lest the contractors pass them on to the government 
through increased contract rates.167 
When Boyle reached the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia 
affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s holding, but explicitly rejected 
the Fourth Circuit’s Feres analysis and methodically explained 
why that rationale was unacceptable.168  For purposes of this 
Note, Justice Scalia’s narrowness argument is of particular 
interest.  The Court’s assertion that a Feres rationale would fail 
to bar civilian suits clearly decides that at least some cases 
brought by civilian plaintiffs are undesirable.169  The Boyle 
majority supports this position with an exception to the waiver 
of sovereign immunity in the FTCA.170  This exception retains 
  
would . . . defeat the purpose of the immunity for military accidents conferred upon the 
government itself.”).  The Fourth Circuit decided Tozer on the same day as Boyle, using 
the same reasoning. 
 167 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510. 
 168 Justice Scalia wrote:  
We do not adopt [the Feres] analysis because [applying the Feres doctrine] 
logically produces results that are in some respects too broad and in some 
respects too narrow.  Too broad, because if the Government contractor 
defense is to prohibit suit against the manufacturer whenever Feres would 
prevent suit against the Government, then even injuries caused to military 
personnel by . . . any standard equipment purchased by the Government, 
would be covered . . . .  On the other hand, reliance on Feres 
produces . . . results that are in another respect too narrow.  Since that 
doctrine covers only service-related injuries, and not injuries caused by the 
military to civilians, it could not be invoked to prevent, for example, a 
civilian’s suit against the manufacturer of fighter planes, based on a state 
tort theory, claiming harm from what is alleged to be needlessly high levels of 
noise produced by the jet engines.  Yet we think that the character of the jet 
engines the Government orders for its fighter planes cannot be regulated by 
state tort law, no more in suits by civilians than in suits by members of the 
Armed Services. 
Id. at 510-11. 
 169 Specifically, those civilian cases are undesirable that would “regulate” 
government design decisions.  Justice Scalia uses the example of a tort suit 
“regulating” a government officer’s selection of a jet engine.  See supra note 168. 
 170 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.  The exception cited is 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), the 
“discretionary function” exception to the FTCA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity.  
This part of the FTCA retains immunity for 
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, 
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not 
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the 
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not 
the discretion involved be abused. 
Id. 
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immunity in cases where a government official exercises 
discretion in performing an official function.171  Thus, by the 
Boyle majority’s reasoning, the Defense protects the exercise of 
discretion in federal procurement from “regulation” by State 
tort law.172 
Since the Boyle decision, government contractors have 
had shelter under the theory that protecting the government’s 
interests in flexible military procurement includes protecting 
its contractors.173  Thus, Boyle extends the umbrella of 
sovereign immunity to shield those contractors sufficiently 
engaged in providing government equipment.174  Under the 
current formulation of the Defense, a contractor must satisfy 
three prongs: specification, conformance, and disclosure.175  
Justice Scalia explained that the first two prongs were to 
ensure that the facts are such that liability would threaten a 
government officer’s “discretionary function.”176  These prongs 
identify the product in question as embodying the will of the 
government (as opposed, for example, to stock catalog products 
designed exclusively by the contractor).  The third prong, 
disclosure, is a safety measure to eliminate a harbor in which 
contractors could silently ignore known product defects that 
could jeopardize their contract.177  That is, the third element 
creates an incentive for contractors to make relevant 
information known by exposing them to liability if they fail to 
reveal such information.178 
  
 171 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. 
 172 Id. (“[W]e think that the character of the jet engines the Government 
orders for its fighter planes cannot be regulated by state tort law, no more in suits by 
civilians than in suits by members of the Armed Services.”). 
 173 See, e.g., Lewis v. Babcock Indus., 985 F.2d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying 
Boyle); Quiles v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 154, 165-70 (D. Mass. 1999) (same). 
 174 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. 
 175 The Court adopted the Fourth (and Ninth) Circuit standard in Boyle: 
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed, 
pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably 
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; 
and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of 
the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States. 
Id. at 512. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 512-13. 
 178 See id.  Notably, the Court rejected a different standard for the Defense 
adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in a similar case, Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace.  Id. at 
513 (citing Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (11th Cir. 1985)).  
The Eleventh Circuit’s alternate formulation allowed the Defense in cases where a 
contractor either had only marginal design input or had significant design input, but 
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The Supreme Court cemented the judicial doctrine of 
the Defense by resolving a circuit split and setting the 
standard for raising the Defense.179  Boyle established that the 
purpose of the Defense is to ensure government autonomy in 
its product procurement by extending the sovereign immunity 
reserved for governmental “discretionary functions” to 
contractors carrying out the discretion of the government.180 
C. Hudgens Extends the Defense to Services Contracts 
Since Boyle, the Defense has expanded.  The Eleventh 
Circuit recently held that the Defense was valid for service 
contracts, as well.181  The court reasoned that the same policy 
for making the Defense available in products liability suits 
against suppliers also applies when victims sue for harms 
caused by service contractors.182  The extension of the Defense 
to service contractors is important because in practice, service 
contractors are more likely to violate human rights than 
manufacturing or design contractors.183 
In summary, the government contractor defense extends 
sovereign immunity to contractors who operated as agents of 
  
warned the government of defects and was authorized to proceed nonetheless.  Shaw, 
778 F.2d at 746.  The Supreme Court found that this approach would chill contractor 
participation by rewarding avoidance of design input.  Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513.  That is, 
by failing to immunize unconditionally contractors who had exercised significant 
design input, the Eleventh Circuit’s formulation would discourage contractors from 
active engagement with product design.  In rejecting this formulation, the Supreme 
Court found that the harms of contractor non-participation outweighed the value of a 
more narrowly tailored and easily applied test. 
 179 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512-13. 
 180 Id. at 511-12. 
 181 Hudgens v. Bell Helicopter, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding a 
helicopter maintenance company not liable to surviving family of U.S. Army pilots who 
died when government officers instructed maintenance personnel not to examine the 
helicopter for certain wear defects). 
 182 Id. at 1333-34.  This reasoning is interesting because service contract suits 
are likely to rest on a negligence theory, while strict liability governs suits brought for 
harms caused by defective products.  The different standards are important because 
disallowing the government contractor defense in suits against service contractors 
leaves them to defend a case in negligence, arguably an easier battle than a products 
liability case.  Thus, taking the shield of the Defense away from contractors is less 
disadvantageous to the service contractor (the type of contractor more likely to violate 
human rights) than taking the same shield from a manufacturing or design contractor. 
 183 Service contractors by definition require performance of a service, such as 
a helicopter repair technician, or more suitably for purposes of this Note, an 
interrogation specialist.  These service contractors will have greater exposure to aliens 
who might bring ATS suits than would, for example, a manufacturer-contractor 
producing an engine part.  It would be much more likely that a private military 
translator or interrogator would violate an alien’s human rights than would an 
equipment provider. 
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the government.184  The next part of this Note specifies issues 
that arise in ATS suits alleging human rights violations by 
U.S. government contractors185 and then suggests that barring 
the Defense in ATS suits resolves many of these issues.186 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The Defense should not be allowed in ATS cases because 
the Defense thwarts the purposes of the ATS.  Courts have 
recently accepted the ATS, at least to a limited degree, as a 
human rights enforcement mechanism.187  The Defense is a 
shield of sovereign immunity, owned by the government, but 
used by private contractors.  The government extends this 
shield to contractors to protect the government’s discretion in 
procurement of goods and services.188  The ATS and the Defense 
collide when alien plaintiffs use the ATS to sue government 
contractors over violations of international law.  This impacts 
not only the remedy available to an injured alien, but also 
limits the ATS’s potential as a human rights enforcement 
mechanism.  Cases of collision are likely to occur more 
frequently due to increasing federal reliance on contractors, 
especially in military operations.189  This part of the Note will 
first highlight the individual issues that arise from the conflict 
between the ATS and the Defense.190  Then, it will argue that 
the best solution is a general ban on the Defense in ATS suits, 
subject to a case-by-case exception for executive orders 
specifically granting immunity.191 
A. Problems with Allowing the Defense in ATS Suits 
The conflicting policies behind the ATS and the Defense 
create a problem for courts in cases where government 
contractors tortiously injure aliens.  The American 
  
 184 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A(1) 
(1979) (“Except to the extent that the United States consents both to suit and to tort 
liability, it and its agencies are immune to the liability.”). 
 185 See infra Part IV.A. 
 186 See infra Part IV.B. 
 187 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004). 
 188 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. 
 189 P. W. Singer, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, estimates that 
more than 20,000 non-Iraqi individuals were working for private military contractors 
(“PMCs”) in Iraq in mid-2004.  See Dart, supra note 25. 
 190 See infra Part IV.A. 
 191 See infra Part IV.B. 
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government’s increasing reliance on private military companies 
(“PMCs”) in its operations abroad exacerbates this conflict.192  
With this trend toward privatization of military functions, the 
frequency of cases in which aliens are tortiously injured by 
government contractors and their employees, so-called 
“corporate warriors,”193 is bound to increase.194  Alien plaintiffs 
have filed several such cases in the district courts in the last 
decade.195  With the American military presence in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, military contractors will 
certainly be in a position to violate aliens’ human rights.196  
Thus, identifying, analyzing, and resolving the conflicting 
policies between the ATS and the Defense will become 
increasingly important.197  The following sections identify some 
of the particular and interrelated issues that arise in ATS suits 
against U.S. government contractors. 
  
 192 See Abigail Heng Wen, Note, Suing the Sovereign’s Servant: The 
Implications of Privatization for the Scope of Foreign Sovereign Immunities, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1562-63 (2003); Gail Gibson & Scott Shane, Contractors Act as 
Interrogators; Control: The Pentagon’s Hiring of Civilians to Question Prisoners Raises 
Accountability Issues, BALT. SUN, May 4, 2004, at 1A. 
  For a list of PMCs involved in the Iraq war and the roles they play there, 
see Topsy N. Smalley, Military Contractors, http://www.topsy.org/contractors.html (last 
updated Jan. 2006). 
 193 The current industry comprises several hundred companies competing for 
more than $100 billion in contract revenue.  P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum 
of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
521, 523-24 (2004), available at http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles 
/fellows/singer20040122.pdf (noting that modern international law is not well-suited to 
regulate the sharp global trend toward military privatization). 
 194 See P. W. Singer, Nation Builders and Low Bidders in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 15, 2004, § A at 23 (“From the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison to the mutilation of 
American civilians at Falluja, many of the worst moments of the Iraqi occupation have 
involved private military contractors ‘outsourced’ by the Pentagon.”).  Singer has 
written extensively on the topic of PMCs, including the current depth of their 
involvement in the Iraqi occupation. 
 195 See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(naming private contractor-corporations operating in the government’s Abu Ghraib 
detention facility as defendants); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1088 (S.D. 
Cal. 2004) (same); Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 345-46 (D.N.J. 2004) (naming a 
private contractor-corporation operating a correctional facility as a defendant). 
 196 See Smalley, supra note 192 (showing the magnitude of the PMC 
involvement in Iraq). 
 197 Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17-19 (D.D.C. 2005) (refusing 
to consider whether the government contractor defense bars claims alleging torture 
until after discovery has taken place). 
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1. The Defense Facilitates Liability Laundering in 
Spite of Human Rights Norms 
Allowing contractors to use the Defense enables a type 
of liability laundering scheme.  Put differently, allowing the 
Defense creates a loophole in which the government can wash 
its hands of political or financial responsibility by assigning the 
liability to its contractors, whom the Defense will immunize.198  
If the government can depend on the Defense to protect its 
contractors, then it would be advantageous to assign 
government “dirty work” to the contractors.  The contractors, in 
turn, will happily take on these jobs because the government’s 
immunity will protect them from liability.199  In court, the 
contractor would merely need to show a governmental exercise 
of discretion and that the contractor reported potential flaws in 
the plan to the government.200  This liability laundering not 
only enables the sorts of practices the United States openly 
condemns – such as torture201 or slavery202 – but also removes 
the political accountability essential to keeping the government 
honest.203 
This loophole means the government could use creative 
corporate structures as shelters from the liability of a specific 
military operation that could be questionable in the light of 
international law.204  Military intelligence gathering provides a 
timely example of how such a scheme might work.205  The 
government could benefit by torturing a captured soldier in 
order to extract information, but it might face international 
reproach for its actions.206  After all, international consensus 
  
 198 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). 
 199 Id. 
 200 This exercise of discretion need not be highly visible, “perhaps no more 
than a rubber stamp from a federal procurement officer who might or might not have 
noticed or cared about the defects, or even had the expertise to discover them.”  Id. at 
515 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 201 See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 §§ 2, 3, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note 
(2005) (creating an explicit cause of action for torture and specifying that torture is a 
violation of international law which triggers jurisdiction under the ATS); see also supra 
note 112 (quoting legislative comments regarding the TVPA). 
 202 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 203 Recent American proactivity in the name of defense of human rights would 
seem to be at odds with such an outcome.  See Stephens, supra note 59, at 922-24. 
 204 Id. 
 205 This is not to make any claims as to the facts of cases like those of the Abu 
Ghraib or Guantanamo Bay detainees, but rather serves as a hypothetical illustration. 
 206 Some nations employ a similar method of liability laundering to diffuse 
responsibility for torture.  This method, often called “rendition,” utilizes other nations 
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condemns torture as a method of intelligence gathering.207  And 
locally, the TVPA, a federal statute, expressly denounces 
torture and provides a cause of action to redress this activity.208  
To avoid reproach, among other reasons, the government would 
not use uniformed military personnel for this type of mission.  
However, an entrepreneurial privateer could fill this niche by 
forming a corporation to carry out a specific mission for which 
the government could not use uniformed military personnel.  
This way, if publicly exposed, the contractor would shield the 
government from outrage, which the public would direct 
primarily at the contractor.  At the same time, the corporation 
could use the Defense to retain its profits from the illicit 
endeavor.209  The net result would be a public relations victory 
for the government and a financial win for the contractor. 
One might argue that if courts allow contractors to raise 
the Defense, accountability would flow from the contractor to 
the government.  The argument is that because a contractor 
raising the Defense would need to prove that the government 
ordered the contractor to act in violation of international law, 
the public would know of the government’s responsibility.210  
This perfect transfer of accountability from the contractor to 
the government, however, is unrealistic.  Nevertheless, such a 
chain of delegation would at least diffuse the blame for 
activities in violation of international law.  For example, 
photographs of uniformed military personnel engaged in 
human rights abuses, such as those seen following the 
incidents at Abu Ghraib, provoke criticism from the American 
  
instead of private contractors.  A nation in possession of a prisoner “renders” 
(transfers) a prisoner into the custody of another nation with the diplomatic assurance 
that the prisoner will not be tortured.  This assurance amounts to a wink and a smile 
between nations who fully intend that the prisoner be tortured to extract useful 
information.  See Human Rights Watch, “Outsourcing” Torture, http://www.hrw.org 
/campaigns/torture/renditions.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2006). 
 207 Though the definition of torture may be disputed, civilized nations 
unquestionably agree that torture is a jus cogens offense.  See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, 
supra note 83, at 9 (“Human rights abuses widely considered to be subject to universal 
jurisdiction include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture.”); 
Parker & Neylon, supra note 83, at 413-14 (“Most areas of great human rights 
concern – illegal treaties, humanitarian (armed conflict) law, apartheid, genocide, 
torture, violations of  the right to life and the plight of refugees – are governed by jus 
cogens.”). 
 208 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2005) 
(expanding the scope of the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, by creating an explicit 
cause of action for torture victims); see also supra note 112 (quoting legislative 
comments regarding the TVPA). 
 209 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). 
 210 The contractor would need to prove it was the government’s agent.  See id. 
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public.211  Those pictures are powerful; they speak for 
themselves.  In contrast, a second, similar photograph of 
civilian military contractors engaged in identical behavior 
would require a caption explaining that the subjects of the 
photograph were government contractors with specific orders 
from the government to carry out the violative actions.  This 
second photograph would elicit less public criticism of the 
government because people would focus their outrage on the 
contractors who perpetrated the wrong instead of on the 
government, which ordered that the wrong be committed.  
Thus, as a public relations matter, the government would prefer 
the latter scenario.  Even if the public attributes some 
responsibility for such actions to the government, the 
laundering tactic at least allows diffusion of blame. 
If Congress and the federal courts allow defendants to 
raise the Defense in ATS suits, they create a loophole through 
which the government may diffuse or eliminate responsibility 
for acts in violation of international law.  A nation committed to 
preventing torture and tyranny around the world212 should be 
wary of such covert activities. 
2. Allowing the Defense Threatens National Security 
and Credibility 
If one of the initial purposes of the ATS was to prevent 
an alien injury or an incident such as the Marbois Affair from 
escalating to armed conflict,213 one might draw modern analogs 
that illustrate the ATS’s relevance.  Of course, today, there is 
less concern that “denial of justice” to an alien will incite that 
alien’s nation to declare war against the United States.214  But 
today, America is more concerned that the mistreatment of 
aliens will lead to terrorist retaliation against American 
citizens abroad or at home.215  Thus, a modern incarnation of 
  
 211 See, e.g., Zernike, supra note 115. 
 212 See David E. Sanger, Bush Hails Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, at 1 
(“‘The people of Iraq have spoken to the world, and the world is hearing the voice of 
freedom from the center of the Middle East,’ Mr. Bush said . . . after the polls closed in 
Iraq.”). 
 213 See Burley, supra note 36, at 464; see also supra Part II.A.1-2 (discussing 
the denial of justice and diplomatic safety theories of the ATS’s enactment). 
 214 See Gathii, supra note 47 (emphasizing the United States’ enormous global 
influence). 
 215 Kenneth Roth, Letter to the Editor, Torture, Terror and the Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 19, 2004, at 24 (noting that the precedent set by some disputed 
interrogation methods approved by the Bush administration “endangers Americans 
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the original purpose of the ATS might be avoidance of a 
terrorist backlash against American citizens in Iraq or America 
for the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. 
In addition to threatening national safety, allowing the 
Defense conveys impertinence to the international community.  
Arguably, the drafters of the ATS had the foresight to recognize 
the increasing importance of international cooperation.216  By 
that view, the ATS is a courtesy extended, if not a duty owed, to 
the citizens of nations with which Americans transact business 
and exchange culture.217  If international cooperation was 
indeed a part of what the drafters of the ATS had in mind, 
allowing the Defense in ATS suits would defeat their intent by 
barring redress and deterrence of human rights abuses.  That 
is, hiding our contractors behind the wall of sovereign 
immunity would tarnish the ATS, an American “badge of 
honor.”218 
3. Contractor Immunity Defies the Ubi Jus, Ibi 
Remedium Principle 
Alien plaintiffs injured by U.S. contractors have two 
potential paths to redress: they may attempt to sue the 
government or the contractors.  Courts might not allow ATS 
plaintiffs to sue the government for reasons of sovereign 
immunity, discussed above,219 and the Defense would bar a suit 
against the contractor.220   
  
and others in custody. It also encourages the excesses of Abu Ghraib, undermines 
international cooperation in fighting terrorism and provides a boon to terrorist 
recruiters.”). 
 216 Whether one favors the international duty theory of the origin of the ATS 
or the denial of justice or the diplomatic safety theory, each leaves room for the idea 
that the drafters of the ATS were concerned with international cooperation to minimize 
conflict. 
 217 See Burley, supra note 36, at 481. 
 218 Id. at 464.  Even if the ATS’s drafters were not acting from a sense of 
international duty, in today’s internationalized world, such a sense of duty may be 
nonetheless desirable. 
 219 Sovereign immunity will bar these claims.  Exceptions to the FTCA’s 
waiver of sovereign immunity are likely to apply to ATS plaintiffs, so immunity will be 
retained and ATS plaintiffs will not be able to sue the government.  See supra notes 
151-57 and accompanying text. 
 220 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).  But see Jama 
v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 361 (D.N.J. 2004) (denying summary judgment because 
plaintiffs’ allegations of “inhumane treatment of a huge number of persons accused of 
no crime and held in confinement” were sufficient international law violations to 
establish a claim against a government-contractor defendant under the ATS). 
1412 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:3 
According to the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium, each 
right must have a remedy.  Chief Justice Marshall commended 
this principle in the landmark case Marbury v. Madison: 
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he 
receives an injury.  One of the first duties of government is to afford 
that protection. . . .  “[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that 
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or 
action at law, whenever that right is invaded.”221 
Marshall went on to discuss the importance of the 
availability of remedies to the integrity of American 
government: 
“[E]very right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury 
its proper redress.”  The government of the United States has been 
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.  It will 
certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish 
no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.222 
International consensus holds that certain human 
rights are elevated to the level of jus cogens.223  If ATS 
plaintiffs’ human rights are to be protected,224 there must be a 
remedy; the ATS provides a path to that remedy.  If a 
contractor working for the U.S. government – often an 
American corporation225 – injures an alien plaintiff, it makes 
sense that the most effective remedy to vindicate this right 
would lie in an American court.  But sovereign immunity 
prevents recovery against the government,226 leaving the 
contractor as the only alternative defendant.  If the 
government contractor defense is allowed in ATS suits, all 
paths to redress are blocked for ATS plaintiffs injured by 
government contractors. 
  
 221 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 23).  Of interest for the purposes of this Note is that 
Justice Marshall used the word “individual” and not “citizen.” 
 222 Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 109). 
 223 See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of 
international human rights norms into American law). 
 224 In Sosa, the Supreme Court limited the violations which give rise to ATS 
jurisdiction, but acknowledged that at least some jus cogens norms are included.  Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (“[C]ourts should require any claim based 
on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted 
by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 
18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”). 
 225 See, e.g., Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338 (D.N.J. 2004). 
 226 See supra Part III.A. 
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One could argue that local (foreign) courts or 
international tribunals would vindicate their threatened rights.  
But local people in regions where foreign military forces are 
active are unlikely to have access to effective courts.  Even in 
cases where a stable and untainted justice system is available, 
judgments entered against contractors by local courts are less 
likely to be satisfied than judgments by U.S. district courts.  
Similarly, international tribunals are complicated by significant 
jurisdictional issues, in part because they are typically 
convened to address the fallout of a singular crisis rather than 
to deal with ongoing violations.227  These potential solutions are 
inadequate to provide reliable (or possibly any) remedies to 
alien plaintiffs. 
B. Solution: Disallowing the Defense in ATS Suits 
The obvious solution would be to bar the Defense 
entirely in suits with jurisdiction founded upon the ATS.  That 
is, when aliens seek redress for extraterritorial torts, Congress 
or the courts could suspend the Defense for policy reasons.  
Disallowance of the Defense would change the focus of 
litigation from the application of the Defense (i.e., determining 
the degree of government oversight of the contractor-
defendant)228 to human rights enforcement (i.e., whether the 
action was a tort and whether it was in violation of 
international law).229 
Disallowance of the Defense in ATS suits might raise 
contractors’ costs, but this increase can be viewed as full 
  
 227 For example, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia was limited to certain crimes during the Yugoslav conflict of the 
early 1990s.  Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia arts. 1-5, 
May 25, 1993 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1170-74, available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-
e/index.htm.  The International Criminal Court, effective in 2002, is still in its infancy 
and the United States has not submitted to its jurisdiction. Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int; Vicki C. Jackson, World Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 303, 343 n.228 
(2006). 
 228 The Ibrahim case illustrates the focus on these administrative details: 
More information is needed on what exactly defendants’ employees were 
doing in Iraq.  What were their contractual responsibilities?  To whom did 
they report?  How were they supervised?  What were the structures of 
command and control?  If they were indeed soldiers in all but name, the 
government contractor defense will succeed, but the burden is on defendants 
to show that they are entitled to preemption. 
Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 22-23 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 229 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (2004). 
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internalization of the costs of their commercial activities.  This 
internalization would give alien tort victims a means to redress 
for the contractors’ wrongful actions while deterring future 
wrongful activities.230  In ATS suits, the wrongful actions are 
violations of international law; deterring such serious 
violations outweighs the increased contractor costs.  To further 
tailor the solution, Congress could mitigate the harms of 
mechanical disallowance of the Defense by allowing executive 
orders to immunize contractors in individual cases of 
exceptional importance. 
Disallowance of the Defense would achieve consistency 
of purpose.  The American government is willing to hold officers 
of foreign governments responsible for their offenses by holding 
them liable in their personal capacity.231  These individuals are 
actors within their government – agents, in a way.232  Cases 
discussing the Defense frequently reason that contractors are 
acting as the government’s agents.233  Since U.S. courts have 
been willing to try abusive officers of foreign governments as 
agents of those governments (whether or not they qualify as 
state actors), it seems courts should also be willing to try 
contractors engaged as agents of the U.S. government.  If 
contractors are the private muscle of the government, why 
should they receive any more sovereign immunity protection 
than the defendant-dictators that courts have already held 
liable?234  Further, the modern, restrictive conception of 
sovereign immunity is that state actors are only immune for 
those acts that are traditionally sovereign in nature.235  Torture 
  
 230 See Willett, supra note 34, at 36 (noting that corporations are responding 
to ATS litigation by enacting new policies against human rights violations). 
 231 See Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We do not agree 
that the law of nations, as understood in the modern era, confines its reach to state 
action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations 
whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private 
individuals.”). 
 232 Id. at 245 (“In construing the [TVPA] terms ‘actual or apparent authority’ 
and ‘color of law,’ courts are instructed to look to principles of agency law. . . .”).  For 
example, by carrying out orders to force a village into slave labor, an individual 
officer – military or bureaucratic – is acting on behalf of a government. 
 233 See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 525 (1988) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (“The action of the agent is ‘the act of the government.’”) (quoting 
Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 22 (1940)). 
 234 See supra notes 125-30. 
 235 Letter from Jack B. Tate to Philip B. Perlman, supra note 149; see supra 
note 231 (quoting the Second Circuit’s holding in Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40, that state 
action is not necessary to hold a government officer personally liable). 
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is hardly an appropriate sovereign activity to which courts 
should extend immunity. 
Further, the exposure of a government contractor to 
liability from alien plaintiffs is not a legal novelty.  The risk of 
contractor liability to aliens is no different than the risk of 
liability that any run-of-the-mill business expects in the 
regular course of dealings with American citizens.236 
1. How Disallowance of the Defense Might Be 
Implemented 
The Defense could be disallowed in two ways – judicially 
or legislatively.  First, federal courts could disallow the Defense 
as a matter of policy, holding that the Defense cannot nullify 
the ATS’s purpose.  Courts could rely on the latitude granted by 
Sosa to hold that orders to violate international human rights 
norms are not within the discretion of government officials.237  
In so holding, courts would decide that contractors are not 
entitled to the immunity conferred by the “official discretion” 
exception because there is no protectable exercise of discretion 
by a government actor.238 
This judicial disallowance could stand on its own or be 
supplemented (or supplanted) by legislation.  Congress could 
enact legislation, possibly amending the ATS itself, clarifying 
that courts are not to allow the Defense in ATS suits.239  The 
legislative method could also include an exception whereby an 
executive order could grant immunity on a case-by-case basis.240  
  
 236 Any business expects some exposure of tort liability, including liability for 
the actions of its employees.  Businesses are arguably on better notice when dealing 
with non-citizens that they should look out for the interests of those affected by their 
work.  Government contractors could harly complain that ATS suits create 
unforeseeable liabilities.  Nor can they claim that they will be overwhelming in 
number.  ATS suits are harder to bring than garden-variety tort suits because the tort 
alleged must amount to a violation of international law.  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (limiting the causes of action available to ATS plaintiffs); 
Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining the 
requirements for a prima facie case under the ATS). 
 237 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731-33 (2004). 
 238 See Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 361 (D.N.J. 2004) (denying 
summary judgment on ATS claims against a contractor operating a detention center). 
 239 This might look something like the Torture Victim Protection Act’s 
clarification that torture and extrajudicial killing are offenses that give rise to 
jurisdiction under the ATS, and supply a cause of action in international law.  28 
U.S.C. § 1350 note (2005). 
 240 Congress could also create explicit guidelines for how and when the 
Executive may issue such an Order.  This would help prevent the exception from 
swallowing the rule.  For example, Congress might include a guideline requiring 
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Officers within the Executive Branch might recommend that 
the President issue an order immunizing a specific defendant 
or defendants as needed.  Such immunization orders are not 
uncommon.  For example, in 2003, President George W. Bush 
issued a broad executive order categorically immunizing from 
tort liability any defendant involved in the Iraqi petroleum 
industry.241  Default liability would provide plaintiffs with a 
path to redress and deterrence in almost all cases, while the 
executive order exception would retain flexibility in exigent 
cases.  Further, since the executive branch would need to act 
affirmatively to immunize defendants under this approach, the 
executive officers would assume at least some political 
responsibility for the results of the immunity. 
This approach neatly addresses liability laundering by 
assigning responsibility to contractors in the general case and 
to the Executive Branch in exceptional cases.  It also means 
that plaintiffs will usually have a means to recover for their 
injuries and deter future human rights violations.242 
  
evidence that a contractor would be unable to provide a critical service during a time of 
crisis if held liable in a specific suit.  Such guidelines might prevent the Executive from 
issuing a string of boilerplate immunity orders when engaging in projects.  This 
approach allows Congressional control over the situation in which the executive branch 
may issue an order. 
  To ameliorate rock-and-a-hard-place decisions where a contractor must 
choose to risk liability in tort or in breach, a defense or cause of action could be created 
to complement their liability.  Such a defense could protect contractors from suit where 
they denied a government’s instructions in a good faith belief that the instructions 
were in violation of international law – this would at least insulate the contractor from 
liability to the government and the injured.  More proactively, a cause of action could 
allow contractors to recover some or all of the value of their contract when they have 
failed to perform the contract for international illegality.  This cause, a type of 
indemnity or hold-harmless suit would burden the government directly with the cost of 
the lost performance (which the government would need to cover at its own expense) 
and some part of the contract (perhaps under an unjust enrichment theory).  Such a 
cause of action would minimize a contractor’s fear of being given illegal instructions, 
but would arguably create some amount of hesitation for government officials in 
issuing orders to contractors.  How often and to what extent this hesitation would occur 
and whether it is desirable are questions outside the scope of this discussion. 
 241 Exec. Order No. 13,303, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,931 (May 22, 2003). 
 242 While disallowing the Defense may be the easiest path to clear for ATS 
plaintiffs, there are certainly other options available.  For example, Congress could 
amend the FTCA to allow suits against the government or allow ATS suits under 
occupation law.  See Scheffer, supra note 28, at 858-60 (suggesting a re-examination of 
the principles underlying occupation and trusteeship law to protect transitional 
societies such as modern Iraq).  These solutions are somewhat more complex than 
disallowing the Defense, but could be implemented alternatively or to complement the 
solution suggested here. 
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2. Disallowance Protects Desirable Discretion While 
Deterring Human Rights Abuse 
One potential argument against denying immunity to 
contractors is that liability to aliens for the actions of their 
personnel would discourage contractors from engaging with the 
government on foreign missions.  As mentioned above, an 
instruction to a contractor to act in violation of international 
law puts the contractor into a precarious situation.243  
Compliance with the instruction risks a tort suit by the injured 
alien, while refusal to comply risks a breach suit by the 
government.  Though this exposure only arises when the 
government issues questionable instructions, contractors may 
not be able to tell if and when the government might do so. 
Instead of being a drawback to disallowance, this grey 
area might be a benefit, as it creates a desirable reluctance to 
carry out those orders that are in or near the realm of human 
rights violations.  Liability would force participating 
contractors to monitor their personnel carefully and to refrain 
from engaging in questionable activities.  Full liability might 
deter undesirable behavior, a function the tort system serves 
particularly well. 
Though the Boyle majority adopted the Defense to 
protect the discretion of American officials, there was clear 
division within the Court regarding the impact of tort litigation 
on official discretion.244  Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
Blackmun reasoned that while it is not impossible for 
contractors to pass the costs of tort suits on to the government, 
the impact that these costs would have on a government 
officer’s discretion would be “marginal.”245  Marginal is hardly a 
word that could be used to describe the countervailing human 
rights abuses that the Defense helps enable in ATS suits.  The 
  
 243 One example of such an instruction might be to torture information out of 
a prisoner in violation of the Geneva Convention.  See supra note 240. 
 244 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 515-31 (1988) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 245 See id. at 523-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“On the one hand, whatever 
marginal effect contractor immunity might have on the effective administration of 
policies of government, its harm to individual citizens is more severe than in the 
Government-employee context.” [internal quotation marks omitted]) (citing Barr v. 
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959)). 
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Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the effect of damages on 
governmental decisions echoes this rationale.246 
Few would argue that government contracts are a risky 
business.  The government is a stable customer well-known for 
providing amply for its vendors.  For various reasons, 
competition for many contracts is limited to only a few bidders 
and the government compensates those who bid well for their 
products and services.  It is unlikely that allowing tort liability 
would bring the American military to a grinding halt.247 
V. CONCLUSION 
The government contractor defense protects contractors 
on the theory that they are instruments of the government.  
This makes sense in certain contexts.  If a soldier is injured 
when a government-designed rifle explodes in his face, the 
Defense should insulate the government and manufacturer 
from liability.248  This insulation means that society is willing to 
deny tort damages to soldiers because the soldiers’ injuries are 
a part of the cost of national defense.  That is, the nation 
collectively agrees that the price of defending America includes 
injuries to its military personnel.  If Americans disagree with 
this policy, they may use their political input (elective and 
legislative) to create a cause of action through which injured 
soldiers may recover damages.249  
This rationale holds as long as the plaintiff is an 
American citizen.  In contrast, an ATS suit has inherently 
different facts.250  The victim-plaintiff in an ATS suit does not 
  
 246 See Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1992) (declaring 
the case justiciable in part because actions seeking damages are unlikely to interfere 
with governmental processes, especially in military actions). 
 247 See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva 
Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 202 (2004) (“In the authors’ view, the alleged 
dilemma that forces the President to choose between protecting national security and 
upholding the rule of law is a false dichotomy, at least insofar as the Geneva 
Conventions are concerned.”). 
 248 The Feres doctrine embodies this rationale, but specifically immunizes the 
government.  This hypothetical is used to illustrate a situation where the Defense 
legitimately immunizes a manufacturer-defendant. 
 249 In the Feres context, for example, Congress could enact legislation 
overruling the Feres doctrine and allowing suits by injured military personnel against 
the government. 
 250 Human rights violations are vastly different from negligent design.  Courts 
may protect a government purchasing officer or a manufacturer who negligently 
designed, approved, or produced a faulty weapon, but it is hardly the same to protect 
decisions that result in human rights violations.  ATS suits present a unique subset of 
the potential suits brought against government contractors.  For ATS suits to survive a 
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benefit from American national defense.  Also, an ATS plaintiff 
suing a government contractor must allege a violation of 
international law to establish federal jurisdiction, so in an ATS 
suit, more than a simple tort is on the line.  It simply does not 
make sense to say that an alien victim’s human rights are a 
cost of American national defense, especially since the victim 
has no political input, does not receive the benefit of the 
national defense, and is less likely to have an alternative mode 
of enforcement. 
Despite the debate over the ATS’s original significance, 
federal courts,251 Congress,252 and human rights groups253 have 
all recognized that the Statute is an important vehicle to 
enforce human rights norms.  The number of aliens tortiously 
injured by U.S. government contractors (potential ATS 
plaintiffs) is likely to increase proportionally with government 
reliance on private military companies.254 
The government contractor defense legitimately seeks to 
protect U.S. government autonomy in selecting product and 
service contractors by immunizing contractors to prevent pass-
through liability.  This immunity may desirably protect 
autonomy in standard procurement situations, but it creates 
unintended consequences in ATS suits against contractors.  
Allowing the Defense in ATS suits allows liability laundering 
by the government, enabling (if not promoting) human rights 
abuses, like those that occurred at Abu Ghraib.255  Allowing the 
Defense in ATS suits also threatens American national security 
and credibility by denying justice to those we purportedly seek 
to help.256 
  
motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction, they must at least allege a 
violation of international law.  Violations of international law are, on some levels, more 
important than standard state common-law tort suits.  International law has been 
reasoned to include jus cogens offenses like torture and genocide that arise from very 
basic, uniform notions of justice and are only invoked in particularly egregious 
circumstances.  Since ATS suits are likely to rely on these offenses to confer 
jurisdiction, ATS suits are a different animal than common-law tort suits. 
 251 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
 252 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2005); see 
also Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing and applying the 
TVPA); supra note 112 (discussing Congressional intent behind the TVPA). 
 253 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (seminal ATS case in 
which plaintiffs-appellants co-counsel included attorneys from the Center for 
Constitutional Rights). 
 254 See supra Part IV.A. 
 255 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 256 See supra Part II.A. 
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Finally, the Defense denies redress to ATS plaintiffs, 
who are unable to recover damages from the government, 
leaving no existing path to redress.257  While other potential 
legal paths to redress exist,258 disallowing the Defense seems to 
be the simplest of these paths to implement.259 
While certainly not a magic bullet, the ATS has a 
sufficiently narrow scope to deter human rights abuses without 
broadly depressing desirable economic activity or hindering 
government autonomy.  Even if one views the ATS as an 
“awakening monster,” the potential number of ATS suits 
against U.S. government contractors260 is such a small a 
fraction of ATS suits against multinational corporations261 that 
economic depression arguments simply do not attach.262  The 
immunity conferred by the Boyle line of cases protects 
legitimate government autonomy in procurement, but should 
not be extended to protect the grim autonomy exercised by a 
government officer bent on torture, which surely does not 
deserve the shield of sovereign immunity. 
In conclusion, courts should, as a matter of policy, refuse 
to allow government contractors to raise the government 
contractor defense in cases where jurisdiction is based upon the 
Alien Tort Statute.  This policy would deter human rights 
abuses without hindering appropriate government autonomy, 
thus satisfying the policies underlying both the ATS and the 
Defense. 
Ryan Micallef † 
  
 257 See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text (discussing sovereign 
immunity) and Parts III.A, IV.A.3. 
 258 See supra notes 240, 242. 
 259 See supra notes 240, 242.  For example, courts could initially decide to 
disallow the Defense in ATS suits as a matter of policy.  Later, Congress could amend 
the FTCA to allow foreign claims or specifically allow claims under the ATS.  Congress 
could also create or amend jurisdictional statutes, including the ATS itself, to specify 
which suits the courts may hear.  Again, these latter options are outside the scope of 
this discussion, but the reader should note that none of these possible solutions are 
exclusive. 
 260 See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 35. 
 261 This is because military contractors are but a fraction of the international 
economy. 
 262 See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 35. 
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